Showing posts with label Pre-emption Suit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pre-emption Suit. Show all posts

25 June 2022

Judgement passed in the Miscellaneous Case No. 15/2011(Pre-emption)

HEADING OF JUDGEMENT IN ORIGINAL SUIT/CASE 

District: Rajshahi

In the Court of the Senior Assistant Judge, Mohonpur, Rajshahi

Present:  Md. Abdul Malek, Senior Assistant Judge

Miscellaneous Case No. 15/2011 (Pre-emption)

Mr. Akbor Ali and Others (Petitioners)

Versus

Mrs. Nurjahan Bibi and Others (Opposite Parties)

The suit/case’s trial ended and arguments are heard

In the presence of...................

And having stood for consideration to this day, the Court delivered the following judgment: This is an application under section 96 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950. The petitioner filed the case for getting the case lands by way of pre-emption as described in the schedule to the application.


The application in the nutshell:

The recorded tenant of the RS khatian No. 253 was Ghukra Molla, Kolim Molla, and Chhobiron Beowa. Chhobiron Beowa died leaving behind two sons Ghukra Molla, Kolim Molla. Ghukra Molla died leaving behind three sons, namely Mokbul Hosen, Akbor Ali, and Shoriful Islam, as well as four daughters, Johra, Jahanara, Aklima, and Sowkotara. Here, Akbor Ali and Shoriful Islam are petitioners and others are impleaded as O.P. Nos. 2-5.  While the Petitioner pre-emtors and the seller (proforma) O.P. Nos. 2-5 are co-sharers by inheritance, the opposite party No. 01 is a stranger to the holding in question. Suddenly, the opposite party No. 02 surreptitiously sold the scheduled lands in question to the opposite party No. 01 without serving any notice whatsoever. Subsequently, the petitioners came to know about the disputed sale from village gossip on 14/03/2011 and definitely on 15/03/2012 after obtaining the certified copy of the disputed sale. Although the deed in question is shown as a gift deed, the same is not a gift deed, insteed an out and out sale deed. The petitioners prayed for pre-empting the lands scheduled to the petition and hence is the case.


Written objections in short:

The Purchaser Opposite Party (hereinafter, OP) No. 01 contested the case by filing the written objection, denying the material averments made in the pre-emptors’ petition. They contended inter alia that the very petition is legally untenable, barred by limitation, and suffers from the defect of parties. The contesting Opposite Party stated that The recorded tenant of the RS khatian No. 253 was Ghukra Molla, Kolim Molla, and Chhobiron Beowa. Chhobiron Beowa died leaving behind two sons Ghukra Molla, Kolim Molla. Ghukra Molla died leaving behind three sons, namely Mokbul Hosen, Akbor Ali, and Shoriful Islam, as well as four daughters, Johra, Jahanara, Aklima, and Sowkotara.

Here, Akbor Ali and Shoriful Islam are petitioners and others are impleaded as O.P. Nos. 2-5. The O.P. No. 02 transferred the case lands to the O.P. No. 01 and thereafter, the latter had built houses on thereon and improved the landscape by expending TK. 50,000. The O.P. also stated that the Petitioners were aware and cognizant of the disputed deed from the very inception. Additionally, since the Petitioners filed the case for unlawful gain, basing on the false and fabricated statements; they (the Petitioners) are not entitled to get back the case lands as they prayed for.


Points for Determination:

Considering the parties’ petition and written objection, the points for determination are fixed with a modification in the following way:

1)      Whether the case is maintainable in the present form and manner. 

2)    Whether the case is bad for the defect of parties.

3)     Whether the case is barred by limitation.

4)    Whether the petitioners are co-sharers by inheritance in the holding in question.

5)     Whether the petitioners may get relief as prayed for.

Discussions and the Decisions:

In proof of the claims, the petitioners examined four oral witnesses as PW 01-02, and produced documentary evidence marked as exhibit Nos. 01-03). On the other side, the Opposite Party No. 01 also examined oral witnesses as OPWs 01-02 and put forward documents marked exhibit Nos. Ka-Cha.


Point for Determination No. 02:

All the co-shares are necessary parties in a pre-emption case. Pre-empting right is not absolute, but subject to the right of other co-sharers. Since the cause of actions for a pre-empting right accrues to those all who are entitled to file an application for pre-emption against the transferee, impleading necessary parties are considered as mandatory and not directory one. Consequently, the omission does not absolve the pre-emptor of his mandatory duty to implead them by ascertaining necessary particulars [vide 4 BLD (AD) 27].  Thus, an omission of a necessary party is vitiating and fatal to pre-emption cases. On perusal of the case record, it appears before the Court that with regard to the plea of defect of parties for the instant case, the opposite parties neither produced any discourse as to the omission of a necessary party in pleading, nor proved the same through any documentary testimony. To consider the exhibited deeds and the depositions given in examination-in-chief as PW- 01, it appears that all co-sharer tenants of the lands in question [RS khatian No. 253] are impleaded as parties to the instant case. It is, therefore, decided that the petitioners have successfully impleaded all the necessary parties in the case, and thus, the case seems to imply that the same is free from the defect of parties. Hence, this point is decided in the Petitioners’ favor.


Point for Determination No. 03:

These issues are taken together for the sake of brevity, convenience, and interrelation. As per section 96(1) of the 1950 State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, a pre-emption case is to be filed within two months of the service of notice under section 89; or if no notice has been served under that section, within two months of the “date of knowledge” of the disputed sale. The relevant law envisages that the date of obtaining a certified copy of the disputed deed will be considered as the 'date of knowledge' contemplated as a 'complete and definite date of knowledge as to the disputed sale' in case of non-service of notice [vide 15 MLR 207, 9 BLD 197]. On perusal of the materials on record, it appears that there is no proof in the support of the service of notice as aforesaid. Accordingly, this application for pre-emption will not be barred if it is filed within two months from the date of knowledge for no notice is served under section 89. Hence, the date of initial knowledge of this kind is not worth-considering. Rather, the date of definite knowledge is to be considered hereinafter.

07. In evidence, it occurs on record that the petitioners came to know about the disputed deed in people's mouths on 14/03/2011 and definitely on 15/03/2011 after obtaining the certified copy of the disputed sale [PW-01]. Although the petitioners just said that they heard about it from the crowd, they specifically mention a person’s name [Islam] in the cross-examination of the PW-01. The PW-02 [Islam] deposed in support of the petitioner on the date of knowledge in the same sense and manner. In addition, it is evident that exhibit No. 02 demonstrates that the certified copy of the impugned sale deed was obtained on 15/03/2011 from the concerned Sub-Registry Office; and the instant miscellaneous case (pre-emption) was filed on 28/03/2011. So, the intervening time between these two dates is clearly within the prescribed period of time: two months from the date of so-called knowledge. Consequently, it prima facie appears that the petitioners’ date of knowledge regarding the disputed deed should be reckoned from when the certified copy of the impugned sale deed was obtained by them.

08. Conversely, the opposite side robustly objected to the reckoning of the limitation on account of the date of knowledge. Although the O.P. in her pleading underscores that she was gifted with the lands in the case jote stated in RS khatian No. 253; she declined to substantiate such claim in her testimony as the OPW-01. Her other witness OPW-02 additionally did not support the fact that the petitioners had prior knowledge about the disputed deed. As such, it appears that the petitioner's witness here supported them but the opposite parties' case is not supported so far as the date of knowledge is concerned. As a result, it cogently transpires that the petitioners have come before the court with more weighty evidence than the opposite party in this respect so far. The court, therefore, finds no reason for not being satisfied with the standard of proof led by the petitioners with regard to the date of knowledge about the disputed deed. Considering all of the points discussed above, it is decided that the petitioners had no prior and full knowledge about the disputed deed till obtaining the certified copy of the same.

09. As aforesaid, an application for pre-emption must be filed within “two months” of the date of the knowledge of the sale. As such, the whole fabric of the evidential edifice convinces the court to hold that application for pre-emption was clearly filed within two months of the date of the knowledge about the deed in question [vide section 96 (1), the SAT Act]. In view of the above propositions of law and facts, it is, therefore, found that the case has been filed within the period of time prescribed in law; and thus, the same is not barred by law. Hence, this point for determination No. 03 is decided in favor of the Petitioners.

Point for Determination No. 04:

Although the O.P. No. 01 robustly claimed in her pleading that the pre-emptors are not co-sharers in the holding in question, she otherwise admitted that the recorded tenants of the RS khatian No. 253 was Ghukra Molla, Kolim Molla, and Chhobiron Beowa. Chhobiron Beowa died leaving behind two sons Ghukra Molla, Kolim Molla. Ghukra Molla died leaving behind three sons, namely Mokbul Hosen, Akbor Ali, and Shoriful Islam, as well as four daughters, Johra, Jahanara, Aklima, and Sowkotara. Here, it is evident that Akbor Ali and Shoriful Islam are petitioners and others are impleaded as O.P. Nos. 2-5 [vide PW-01, DW-01].

11. Moreover, it further appears that the materials on record supported this premise in many ways that the current petitioners are also co-sharers by inheritance. The reasons are simple: no partition is proven to be complete so far, as well as the tenancy of the holding is yet to be split up regarding the lands in question before the institution of this case. Accordingly, the court finds no convincing or unimpeachable evidence that is independently led by the O.P. in support of the alleged extinguishment of the petitioner’s co-shareship in the holding in question. Therefore, it is the court’s view that while the petitioner pre-emtors are co-sharers by inheritance in the tenancy of the holding in question, the opposite party No. 01 is a stranger to the same.

 

Point for Determination No. 1 & 5:

This is an application under section 96 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 and the petitioners filed the case for getting the case lands by way of pre-emption as described in the schedule to the application. It appears that the plaintiff filed the suit before this court having jurisdiction with paying proper court fees and seeking a decree for pre-empting the suit lands. However, it manifestly appears that it is the defendant’s robust defence of plea that the impugned transaction poses as an out and out a gift on the apparent face of the record. The Ext. 02 itself conspicuously shows that the impugned deed is apparently not a sale deed, but rather a deed of gift.

As per section 96(1) of the 1950 State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, a pre-emption case is allowable only in the case of the sale transaction. So, an application for pre-emption will be barred in cases of non-sale transactions. It is now well-established that sale excludes in such a context any other modes of transfer and now; pre-emption shall lie only against a transfer of sale. In the pre-emption application, the petitioners ostensibly claim that although the deed in question is shown as a deed of gift, the same is a sale deed in disguise. As a result, the question of colorable transactions comes into play. Surprisingly, such a colorable transaction contention is somehow supported by statements disclosed in the written objection. But, it is more surprising that the OPW No. 01, the transferee, deposed in denial of the fact set out in her pleading, which could also be taken as setting out a concise summary of the facts and matters upon which the O.P. relies in support of her claim for the relief sought by her.

It indeed occurs that there is no innuendo either in written objection or in oral testimony regarding how the alleged gift had become complete by the acceptance of the offer of gift and the delivery of possession of the case property. However, there is no denying that the scheduled property is now in the possession of the opposite party No. 01. On record, it also transpires that the transferor is the petitioner’s sister who deposed as DW-02 in ways that she made a gift to the O.P. No. 01 and transferred the property in question to the transferee. She tried to reiterate the fact of a gift, instead of a sale but did not provide sufficient implications for how that gift was offered, accepted, and became complete. However, she (OPW-02) underscored, justified, and clarified the background of the gift transaction she made to the O.P. No. 01. In fact, such a justification is tenable in law; because, our case is not an outcome of an oral gift, where the offer and acceptance of gift may be made orally and the delivery of possession follows that oral agreement. Rather, the instant case results from a registered deed, statutorily presumed to be a gift deed. As a result, documentary evidence excludes oral evidence led by the petitioners in this respect so far, and thus, carries them nowhere.

            The OPW-01 specifically mentioned that the petitioners have also transferred some lands at times [admitted], as well as the land in question is situated just adjacent to the transferee, O.P. No. 01.  In fact, the OPW-02 poses to be a critical witness for her competence as a witness and social relations with the party. She faced cross-examination and replied that no local investigation is made to figure out the location of the case property. On the contrary, it also occurs that in the pleading or evidence, the petitioner does not mention anything that denies the current state or the location of the case property as their counter has maintained. Having being commonplace, it is cogently assuming that, although that does not appear as a broad daylight transaction, the delivery of possession follows an offer and acceptance of gift between donor and donee because of their close affinity and social relation.

As a result, since the land under pre-emption has already been transferred to the pre-emptee petitioners, the court is of view that such a plea of mere paper or colorable transaction advanced by the petitioners finds little value in determining whether the transaction was nothing but “a give and take”. So, it could be argued that the pre-emption right might have prevailed if it was otherwise proved that the deed in question was basically a paper transaction or a sale deed in camouflage. Considering the case from that premise, it appears to the court that the plea that the deed is nothing but a colorable transaction for the purpose of defeating the right of pre-emptor holds no water. And in consequence, this application for pre-emption is not maintainable; and thus, there existed no cause of action for the pre-emptors for filing the pre-emption case as such.

More specifically, as per section 96(3) of the 1950 State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, the pre-emptor must deposit, at the time of making the application, in the Court the amount of the “consideration” money of the sold holding or portion or share of the holding as stated in the notice under section 89 or in “the deed of sale”, as the case may be; and “compensation” at the rate of twenty-five per centum of the referred amount. No doubt, the amount mentioned in the deed in question is not the “consideration” money of the holding in question; instead, that is just the property price. In fact, on careful perusal of the materials available on record, the court finds no convincing elements that could be taken into consideration in assessing the consideration money for the disputed deed. The onus was upon the petitioner to come up with such kind of sufficient convincing elements to assess the best possible consideration money for the transaction, if it is proved to be a mere paper or colorable transaction.

It would be verbose to reiterate that section 96 was substituted by section 2 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act No. XXXIV of 2006), and now, a complete sale with consideration money is only preemptible under the current regime. Nothing appears to the contrary to it on materials on record. So, if there is no gross misreading or non-reading or non-consideration of any material piece of evidence, the court is confident enough to hold that since the transfer in question is not a complete sale with manifest consideration money advanced by the parties to the case, the instant case is statutorily barred and thus, not maintainable in its present form. Consequently, it provably appears to the Court that the instant case is clearly barred by the provision of section 96(1) of the 1950 State Acquisition and Tenancy Act.

In view of all of the points discussed above, it is decided that despite having some good points and merits, such as the petitioners are held to be co-sharer of holding in the tenancy, and the pre-emption case was not barred by limitation as the pre-emptor filed the case within the time from the date of his knowledge, the instant case appears to be legally barred and accordingly, not maintainable in the present form and manner. As such, the instant case is barred by law and thus, they may not get relief as prayed for. As such, these issues are not settled in the petitioners’ favor. In consideration and cognizance of the petitions, facts, surrounding circumstances, submitted shred of shreds of evidence, both oral and documentary, on record, and relevant laws, it appears to the Court that the application deserves to be disallowed on contest.

 

The court fee paid is correct.

Hence,

it is  ordered

that the pre-emption application be disallowed on contest against the opposite party No.1 and ex parte against the rest without any order as to costs. The petitioners are hereby permitted to withdraw their deposited money into the court.

(Composed and corrected by me)

continue reading Judgement passed in the Miscellaneous Case No. 15/2011(Pre-emption)

09 May 2022

Judgement passed in the Miscellaneous Case No. 21/2010 (Pre-emption)

District: Rajshahi

In the Court of the Senior Assistant Judge, Mohonpur, Rajshahi

Present:  Md. Abdul Malek, Senior Assistant Judge

Miscellaneous Case No. 21/2010 (Pre-emption) 

Mr. Nader ALi and Others....................…...Petitioners

Versus

Mr. Md. Saidur Rahman and Others.......Opposite Parties

The suit/case’s trial ended and arguments are heard

In the presence of.................

And having stood for consideration to this day, the Court delivered the following judgment: This is an application under section 96 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950. The petitioner filed the case for getting the case lands by way of pre-emption as described in the schedule to the application. 

The application in the nutshell:

The recorded tenant of the SA khatian No. 211 were Chhader Ali, Nader Ali, Jaber Ali, Korimon Bibi, and Arimon Bibi. The RS khatian No. 345 was also prepared in their names.  Chhader Ali died leaving behind 5 sons and 2 daughters; and Nader Ali died leaving behind the petitioners as heirs. The Petitioner pre-emtors and the seller proforma opposite parties are co-sharers by inheritance. Suddenly, the opposite party No. 03 surreptitiously sold the scheduled lands in question to the opposite party No. 01-02 without serving any notice upon the petitioners whatsoever. Subsequently, the petitioners came to know about the disputed sale from village gossip on 05/05/2010 and definitely on 11/05/2010 after obtaining the certified copy of the disputed sale. The petitioners prayed for pre-empting the lands scheduled to the petition and hence is the case.

Written objections in short:

The Purchaser Opposite Party (hereinafter, OP) Nos. 01 and 02 contested the case by filing the written objection, denying the material averments made in the pre-emptors’ petition. They contended inter alia that the very petition is legally untenable, barred by limitation, and hit by the defect of parties. The contesting Opposite Parties stated that the recorded tenant of the SA khatian No. 211 were Chhader Ali, Nader Ali, Jaber Ali, Korimon Bibi, and Arimon Bibi. The RS khatian No. 345 was also prepared in their names.  They purchased some lands in the case jote stated in RS Khatian No. 345 from Karimon Bibi, one of the RS recorded tenants; and have already mutated the suit lands after the said purchase. Accordingly, separate holding is opened and taxes are being paid accordingly, as well as an improvement is also made to the case lands subsequently. They also stated that the Petitioners were aware of the disputed sale and cognizant of the disputed deed from the very inception. Additionally, Since the Petitioners filed the case for unlawful gain and based the same on false and fabricated statements; they (the Petitioners) are not entitled to get back the case lands as they prayed for.

Points for Determination:

Considering the parties’ petition and written objection, the points for determination are fixed with a modification in the following way:

1)      Whether the case is maintainable in the present form and manner. 

2)    Whether the case is bad for the defect of parties.

3)     Whether the case is barred by limitation

4)    Whether the petitioners are co-sharers by inheritance in the holding in question.

5)     Whether the petitioners may get relief as prayed for.

Discussions and the Decisions:

In proof of the claims, the petitioners examined four oral witnesses as PW 01-04, and produced documentary evidence marked as exhibit Nos. 01-03). On the other side, the Opposite Party No. 01-02 also examined oral witnesses as OPWs 01-04 and put forward documents marked exhibit Nos. Ka-Ga.

Point for Determination No. 02:

All the co-shares are necessary parties in a pre-emption case. Pre-empting right is not absolute, but subject to the right of other co-sharers. Since the cause of actions for a pre-empting right accrues to those all who are entitled to file an application for pre-emption against the transferee, impleading necessary parties are considered as mandatory and not directory one. Consequently, the Omission does not absolve the pre-emptor of his mandatory duty to implead them by ascertaining necessary particulars [vide 4 BLD (AD) 27].  Thus, an omission of a necessary party is vitiating and fatal to pre-emption cases. On perusal of the case record, it appears before the Court that with regard to the plea of defect of parties for the instant case, the opposite parties neither produced any discourse as to the omission of a necessary party in pleading nor proved the same through any documentary testimony. To consider the exhibited deeds and the depositions given in examination-in-chief as PW- 01, it appears that all co-sharer tenants of the RS Khatian No. 345 are impleaded as parties to the instant case. It is, therefore, decided that the Petitioners have successfully impleaded all the necessary parties in the case, and thus, the case seems to imply that the same is free from the defect of parties. Hence, this point is also decided in favor of the Petitioners.

Point for Determination No. 04:

It is admitted that the recorded tenants of the SA khatian No. 211 and RS khatian No. 345 were Chhader Ali, Nader Ali, Jaber Ali, Korimon Bibi, and Arimon Bibi. Recorded tenant Nader Ali instituted the case as a co-sharer; and after Nader Ali’s demise during the pending of the case, the petitioners as his legal representatives adopted the petition for pre-emption and thus, are contesting the case.

03. On perusal of the RS Khatian No. 345 and the pleading of the parties, it further appears that since the transferor Karimon Bibi and the petitioners’ father Nadir Ali are the recorded tenants in the same Khatian, the original petitioner Nader Ali is held to be a co-sharer to the tenancy in question. It also appears that since after Nader Ali’s had died during the case’s pendency, his legal representatives, the current petitioners, turns into coherer tenants of the holding by inheritance. The PW-01 as well as DW-01 along with other witnesses supported this premise in many ways that the current petitioners are also co-sharers by inheritance. The reasons are simple: no partition is proven to be complete so far, as well as the tenancy of the holding is yet to be split up regarding the lands in question before the institution of this case. Surprisingly, the Opposite Party No. 01, Md. Saidur Rahman, is also found to be a nephew of Karimon Bibi and Nadir Ali. But [DW-02], there is no evidence that whether the father of Md. Saidur Rahman has already died. Rather, as per the DW-01’s particulars, his father is still alive. Accordingly, he appears to be a stranger to the disputed tenancy in holding.

04. However, the OPs robustly claimed that the pre-emptor is not a co-sharer in the holding in question for a separate holding has been opened in the name of the OP No. 01-02, and on the basis of which, rents are being paid by them. In evidence, it appears that separate holding No. 463 was opened and a proposed Khatian No. 456 prepared in the name of the OP No. 01-02. The Exhibit No. Kha and Ga are these documentary pieces of evidence, which are found to be in support of the OP’s case in this respect. But, the petitioner denied such dissolution of the petitioners’ co-shareship due to the alleged separate holding.

05. It is no denying that the process of separation or sub-division of holding is altogether a different thing and it shall have to be done only after observing the procedure as laid down in section 117c of the aforesaid Act of 1950. Besides, '[a] non-notified co-sharer of the holding which was divided would remain co shares of the holding as if there was no sub-division of holding relating to the claim.' As such, these premises are now amenable to minutely be scrutinized for our purposes. On scrutiny of such documents submitted as such, it appears that a separate holding has been opened with regard to the lands disclosed in the deed in the question of pre-emption. Accordingly, thanks to the deed No. 1153/07 is now under examination of the instant pre-emption proceeding, the said fact of splitting up of the tenancy of the holding holds no water in legal parlance, no matter whether the same is done before the case is instituted or not.

06. The relevant law is well-spoken that when separate Khatians are prepared in the names of the original co-sharers, that co-sharer in whose names separate Khatian have been prepared will cease to be co-sharers of the original holding. [Vide 13 MLR (AD) 144]. Therefore, the court finds no convincing or unimpeachable evidence that is independently led by the O.P. in support of the alleged extinguishment of the petitioner’s co-shareship in the holding in question.  Therefore, it is the court’s view that the Petitioners are co-sharer tenants in the holding in question.

Point for Determination No. 1, 3 & 5:

These issues are taken together for the sake of brevity, convenience, and interrelation. As per section 96(1) of the 1950 State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, a pre-emption case is to be filed within two months of the service of notice under section 89; or if no notice has been served under that section, within two months of the “date of knowledge” of the disputed sale. The relevant law envisages that the date of obtaining a certified copy of the sale deed will be considered as the 'date of knowledge' contemplated as a 'complete and definite date of knowledge as to the disputed sale' in case of non-service of notice [vide 15 MLR 207, 9 BLD 197]. On perusal of the materials on record, it appears that there is no proof in the support of the service of notice as aforesaid. Accordingly, this application for pre-emption will not be barred if it is filed within two months from the date of knowledge for no notice is served under section 89. Hence, the date of initial knowledge of this kind is not worth-considering. Rather, the date of definite knowledge is to be considered hereinafter.

08. In evidence, it occurs on record that the petitioners came to know about the disputed sale from village gossip on 05/05/2010 and definitely on 11/05/2010 after obtaining the certified copy of the disputed sale [PW-01]. Evidently, the exhibit No. 02 demonstrates that the certified copy of the impugned sale deed was obtained on 11/05/2010 from the concerned Sub-Registry Office; and the instant miscellaneous case (pre-emption) was filed on 06/06/2010. So, the intervening time between these two dates is clearly within the prescribed period of time- two months of the date of knowledge of the sale. Consequently, it prima facie appears that the petitioners’ date of knowledge regarding the disputed sale deed should be reckoned from when the certified copy of the impugned sale deed was obtained by them on 11/05/2010. However, conversely, the opposite side robustly objected to the reckoning of the limitation on account of the date of knowledge.

09. In pleading, the O.P. underscores that they purchased the lands in the case jote stated in RS Khatian No. 345; and have already mutated the same lands after they had purchased it. Accordingly, separate holding is opened and taxes are being paid, as well as an improvement is also made to the case lands subsequently. They claim that the petitioners had known about the disputed sale and when they declined to purchase the case lands, they (OPs) did it by paying the consideration money, even in the presence of “Nader Ali” (the original petitioner). In evidence, the OPW-01 concurred with the same propositions and OPW 02-04 supported such claims. As a witness of the disputed deed, the OPW-03 identified himself and highlighted that “Nader Ali” was present at the time of registration along with Saidur, Karimon, and Mojam. Here, Mojam is an identifier of the disputed sale deed. The OPW-02 additionally supported the fact that the petitioners had prior knowledge about the disputed sale and narrated a particular fact relating to it.

10. Surprisingly, the petitioners’ witness PW-04 stated in his cross-examination that he is a co-sharer of the case lands and was conversant about the disputed sale from the very beginning. He also added that “Nader Ali” and his son “Kasem Ali” also knew about the disputed sale from when the disputed deed was executed and registered: meaning that a petitioner's witness here supported the opposite parties' case as to the prior knowledge of the sale. As a result, it cogently transpires that the petitioners could not come before the court with more weighty evidence than the opposite party did as to the knowledge of the sale. In addition, the opposite party submitted documents, including prostabito khatian No. 456 [ext.: kha], rent receipt [ext.: Ga] before the court for inspection. On the close scrutiny of such a documentary piece of evidence, it appears that the land scheduled to the disputed deed has already been mutated against the name of the opposite parties No. 01-02.

11. It is now trite to pinpoint that, in addition to oral evidence discussed hereinbefore, the opposite parties come up before the court with documentary shreds of evidence that exclude the petitioners’ mere oral piece of evidence.  To exemplify, since the process of separation or sub-division of holding shall have to be done only after observing the procedure as laid down in section 117c of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 1950, serving a reasonable notice to the parties concerned is a pre-requisite for a mutation proceeding. Because mutation is done, prostabito khatian is prepared, as well as rents are being paid, it is cogently presumed that the requirement of section 117c of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 1950 is complied with, as nothing is proved to the contrary. To demystify, mere non-production of the concerned volume of the mutation proceeding in question does not disentitle the opposite parties from reaping the benefits of such presumption. The court, therefore, finds no reason for not being satisfied with the standard of proof led by the opposite parties. Considering all of the points discussed above, it is decided that the petitioners had prior and full knowledge about the disputed sale, from the very initiation of the talk about the disputed sale, and definitely, from when the lands in question were “officially” mutated against the names of the opposite parties in the last of 2007.

12. As aforesaid, an application for pre-emption must be filed within “two months” of the date of the knowledge of the sale. As such, the whole fabric of the evidential edifice convinces the court to hold that since the petitioners had prior knowledge about the disputed sale deed, for the year of the deed’s execution in the last of 2007, and the instant application has been lodged in the middle of 2010, it is evidently decided that this application for pre-emption was clearly not filed within two months of the date of the knowledge about the sale in question [vide section 96 (1), the SAT Act]. In view of the above propositions of law and facts, it is, therefore, found that the case has not been filed within the period of time prescribed in law; and thus, the same is barred by law. Hence, this point for determination No. 03 is not decided in favour of the Petitioners. As a result, since the application is barred by limitation, the instant case is not maintainable in the present form and manner. As such, although the petitioners are held to be co-sharer of holding in the tenancy, they may not get relief as prayed for.

In consideration and cognizance of the petitions, facts, surrounding circumstances, submitted shred of shreds of evidence, both oral and documentary, on record, and relevant laws, it appears to the Court that the application deserves to be disallowed on contest.

 

The court fee paid is correct.

Hence,

it is  ordered

that the pre-emption application be disallowed on contest against the Opposite Party No.1 and 2 without any order as to costs.

(Composed and corrected by me)

continue reading Judgement passed in the Miscellaneous Case No. 21/2010 (Pre-emption)

24 February 2022

Ex parte order passed in the Miscellaneous Case No. 24/2018 (Pre-emption under S. 96)

 The record is taken up for passing necessary order. Seen. This is an application for pre-emption of the suit land. Perused the plaint, the deposition of the plaintiff as P.W- 01 & 02, the documentary pieces of evidence (deposit chalan, RS khatian No. 93, the deed in question, etc.), and other materials available on record. It appears that the plaintiff placed the application before this court having jurisdiction with paying proper court fees and seeking a decree for pre-empting the suit land described to the schedule to the application under section 96 of the S. A. T. Act. 1950. Section 96 of the said Act recognizes any aggrieved person’s right to apply for such relief as prayed for under certain conditions, which appears to be met with sufficient implications so far as the instant case is concerned. So, it is decided that the suit is maintainable in its current form and manner.

Upon such perusal and consideration of the adduced pieces of evidence (PW-01 & 02; RS khatian No. 93, the deed in question), it appears that the applicants are co-sharers in the holding in question and the opposite Party No. 01 & 2 is strangers to the holding in question. It also appears that the land so transferred got handed over beyond the knowledge of the petitioner. The petitioner also claims that the land in question is yet to be handed over to the OP No. 01 & 02, and they came to know about the disputed sale on 11.09.2018 upon obtaining the certified copy of the deed in question. Even, it transpires that the petitioners do not suffer from any other legal disqualification under the appertaining laws. Nothing contrary is proved as such.

However, the deed in question appears to be an out-and-out sale deed. Considering all of the points discussed above, it is decided that the instant case is maintainable in the present form and manner. As such, the Petitioner may get relief as prayed for. In consideration and cognizance of the petitions, facts, surrounding circumstances, submitted shreds of evidence both oral and documentary on record and relevant laws, it appears to the Court that the application deserves to be allowed ex parte.

The court fee paid is correct.

Hence, it is ordered

that the pre-emption case be allowed on contest against the Opposite Party No.1-2 without any order as to costs. The pre-emptor will get the scheduled land by way of pre-emption. The Opposite Party (O.P.) No. 1 and 2 are allowed to withdraw the money deposited in their credit. OP No. 1 and 2 are directed to execute and register a sale deed in respect of case lands in favor of the Petitioner within 30 days from the date, given that no tax, duty or fee shall be payable on such registration. In default, the petitioner may realize his pre-empting rights through Court in accordance with the law.

(Composed and corrected by me)

continue reading Ex parte order passed in the Miscellaneous Case No. 24/2018 (Pre-emption under S. 96)

20 January 2022

Decreeing judgement passed in the O.C. suit No. 24/2013 (pre-emption under the Mohammadan Law)

HEADING OF JUDGEMENT IN ORIGINAL SUIT/CASE

District: Rajshahi

In the Court of the Assistant Judge, Mohonpur, Rajshahi

Present:  Senior Assistant Judge 

Sunday, October 31, 2021

Other Class Suit No. 24/2013 (Pre-emption)

In the presence of........

And having stood for consideration to this day, the Court delivered the following judgment: This is an application filed under Mohammedan law for getting the lands by way of pre-emption as described in the schedule to the application. 

The plain in the nutshell:

The suit property described in schedule 'A' is the disputed land of this suit. The R.S. Recorded tenants of the disputed R.S. khatian no. 100 were Mekur Pathan being ten annas, thirteen gondas, one kora and one kranti and Bibizan Nessa being five annas, six gondas, two koras and two kranties. Thereafter, Mekur Pathan died leaving one son, the plaintiff, two daughters and a wife defendant nos. 02-04 respectively and they got the respective lawful shares to the land of their predecessor. Thereafter, Bibizan Nessa died leaving behind a daughter defendant no. 05 namely Motizan Bewa. As such, the plaintiff is the co-sharer by inheritance to the suit land, i.e. he is a shafi-i-sharik to the suit land. Moreover, the plaintiff bears the next two characteristics, i.e. shafi-i-khalit and shafi-i-jar. The defendant No. 01 has no title to a single inch to the suit land. As such, he is a stranger to the suit land. He is not at all shafi of any kind to the suit land in any way.

Defendant No. 01 is the stranger to the suit lands. Suddenly, on 16.02.2013 in the morning, defendant No. 01 came to the suit land revealed that defendant No. 02 sold the disputed land to him by deed No. 383 dated 03.02.2013 beyond the knowledge of the plaintiff. Hearing this news, the plaintiff became very surprised and instantly stood up and frequently claimed the disputed land-based on pre-emption under Mohammedan Law in presence of the present local people. Then in presence of the local people, the plaintiff told defendant No. 01 to execute and register a sale deed of the said disputed land in favor of the plaintiff taking the deed value. Nevertheless, defendant No. 01 refused to do so. It is claimed that defendant No. 01 or 02 did not give notice about the sale to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was totally unknown about the sale of the disputed land. The sale in between the parties that is in between vendor and purchaser was done very secretly. The plaintiff did not know of the matter of sale till they revealed the matter on 16.02.2013. Then, the plaintiff collected the certified copy of the said disputed deed on the same day i.e. on 17.02.2013, and became certain about the collusive sale. Thereafter, the plaintiff is filing this suit for pre-emption under Mohammedan Law of the land in question. 

The plaintiff also claims that the suit land is very essential for the plaintiff. The plaintiff has been in possession over a part of the suit lands of the R.S. plot no. 578 that is over the plot in question. The plaintiff and his family members are residing there on the suit land making their doweling houses for more than 60 years. There lies the grave of the father of the plaintiff and some other relatives of the plaintiff and a bamboo clam over the suit lands. Therefore, the suit is necessary for the plaintiff to get back by way of pre-emption under Mohammedan. The plaintiff performed the legal formalities like, "Talab-iMoasibat" and "Talab-i-Ishad". The plaintiff is interested to get back the disputed land at the price of the said deed or as the court deems proper. Under this situation, the plaintiff claims that he is entitled to get back the disputed land by way of pre-emption under Mohammedan law.

Written Statement in brief:

On the other hand, defendant No. 01 contested the case by filing written objections denying the material averments made in the pre-emptors’ petition. He contended, inter alia, that the very petition is legally untenable, barred by limitation, and hit by a defect of parties. The contesting defendant stated that he purchased some lands in the case jote scheduled from defendant No. 02 who requested and made known all the co-sharers, including the petitioner, about the sale prior to the sale is accomplished. But, no one except the defendant. No. 01 expressed willingness to purchase the same and took possession over case jote scheduled as such after the purchase was done. However, it was also expressed in the written statement that he is now willing to compromise the case with the petitioner and want to take back the consideration money deposited as such and thus, the petitioner could get back the case lands as they prayed for. 

Issues:

Considering the petitions and written objections of the parties, the issues are fixed with modifications for discussions in the following way:

1. Whether the Suit is maintainable in the present form and manner.  

2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation.

3. Whether the suit is bad for defect of parties.

4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to pre-empt the suit land.

5. Whether the petitioner may get relief as prayed for. 

Discussions and the Decision

In proof of the claims, the plaintiff examined himself as PW. 01 on behalf of himself; adduced oral witnesses examined as PW. 02-03, and produced some documents marked as exhibit: 1-04. On the other side, the defendant side examined himself as DW 01 and produced no documentary evidence on his behalf. 

Issue No. 2:

The issue at hand is whether the case is barred by limitation. The plaintiff claims that the cause of action arose firstly on 16.02.2013 AD while the defendant No. 01 firstly coming into the disputed land revealed about the disputed sale of the land in front of the plaintiff and thereafter, on 17.02.2013 while the plaintiff obtained the certified copy of the disputed deed.

As per article 10, 1st schedule, the 1908 Limitation Act, a pre-emption suit is to be filed within one year of the purchaser taking possession of the property, or otherwise, within one year of the registration of the instrument of sale. So, a suit for pre-emption of this kind under Mohammedan Law will not be barred if it is filed within one year from the date of transfer of possession. The PW 01 stated both in examination-in-chief and cross-examination that the possession in the suit land is transferred to defendant No. 01 after the sale is made.  On perusal of the materials on record, it vividly appears that the suit is brought within one year of the purchaser’s alleged taking possession of the property in question. Conversely, the defendant did not prove anything contrary to it. In view of the above propositions of law and facts, it is, therefore, found that the suit has been filed within the period of time prescribed in law. Hence, this issue is decided in favor of the plaintiff.

Issue No. 3:

The issue at hand is whether the suit is bad for the defect of parties. All the co-shares are necessary parties in a pre-emption case. In a pre-emption proceeding, all co-sharers must be impleaded as parties to the proceedings. Provisions for impleading parties are mandatory and not a directory; because the cause of action for pre-emption of any transfer accrues to those all who are entitled to file an application for pre-emption against the transferee. This right is not absolute but subject to the right of other co-sharers. So, in order to get relief by way of pre-emption, the other interested persons must be impleaded by the applicant to enable the Court to adjudicate the claim of the respective parties completely; and the relief cannot be given in the absence of such parties. The Omission did not absolve the pre-emptor of her mandatory duty to implead their by ascertaining necessary particulars. So, the omission of a necessary party is vitiating and fatal to pre-emption cases.

On perusal of the case record, it appears before the Court that with regard to the plea of defect of parties for the instant case, the defendant’s pleading neither produced any discourse as to the omission of a necessary party nor proved the same with any unimpeachable testimony. For ‘the omission of parties is to be pointed out at the earliest point of time by the contesting defendant, any failure to take such recourse is here considered fatal to them. Surprisingly, the plaintiff in his cross-examination said that some co-sharers in the RS Plot No. 578 is left out, but later on, he clarified that RS plot No. 578 is also included in the RS khatian No. 47 and 116, which are not included in the schedule to the plaint.  RS khatian No. 47 and 116 are marked exhibited as 04.  Accordingly, considering exhibit No. 04 and the deposition given by the PW. 01, it is found that the suit is free from the defect of parties. Hence, this point is also decided in favour of the plaintiff.

Issues No. 1, 4 & 5:

Right of pre-emption is known in Muslim Law as 'SHUFA'. It is the right, which the owner of a share in the immovable property possesses to acquire another's share in immovable property for the price for which it has been sold to another person. The right of SHUFA can be claimed by three different classes of persons and one of them is co-sharer ('shafe-e-sharik'), the other two classes are those, who claim the right by way of being owner of adjoining property. The Mohammedan Law relating to demand before filing a suit for pre-emption is of a highly technical nature. It is stated in the Principles of Mohammedan Law by Mulla (16th Edn.) that the talab-i-mowasibal is spoken of as the first demand and the talab-i-ishad as the second demand. The third demand consists of the institution of suit for pre-emption. Both the talabs are conditions precedent to the exercise of the right of pre-emption. 

Firstly, this right arises only out of valid, complete and bona fide sale. The suit deed (Ext: 02) advocates for the plaintiff in this regard. So, the plaintiff’s right of pre-emption vividly arises in the suit so far as the deed in question is solely concerned for the transaction was a bona fide, valid and complete sale. As aforesaid, both the talabs (demands) are conditions precedent to the exercise of the right of pre-emption. On perusal of the PW 01-03 and RS khatian No. 100 (Ext: 01), it becomes a decisive fact that the plaintiff was co-sharer (shafe-e-sharik), and thus, had a right of pre-emption in the suit land. The defendant as DW-01 also admitted in his evidence that the plaintiff is co-sharer (shafe-e-sharik) to the suit holding. Therefore, it is decided that the plaintiff has the right to claim the property on his own standing to be pre-empted for the defendant, who is a stranger to the suit land. 

Secondly, it is time to examine whether the plaintiff had exercised this pre-empting right by way of making two talabs (demands) to exercise the right of SHUFA called as talab-i-mowasibat, when the first demand was spoken, and the talab-i-ishhad as second demand. Both the Talabs are conditions precedent and found to be exercised in accordance with law. So, the next point resounds that strict compliance with all the requirements of the two demands which are necessary before a pre-emptor can succeed in a suit for pre-emption under the Mahommedan Law. The first talab (demand) should be made as soon as the fact of the sale is known to the claimant. Apart from the pleading, the plaintiff is found to prove on record that the first talab was also made without any delay and that the second talab was also made in the presence of two witnesses. He is also found to demonstrate the third demand by way of the institution of the present suit of pre-emption.

In fact, the Mohammedan Law relating to demand before filing a suit for pre-emption is of a highly technical nature. Any unreasonable or unnecessary delay will be construed as an election not to pre-empt, particularly, on the question of the promptness and avoidance of delay with regard to the first demand. The materials on record do not show that the plaintiff made any unreasonable or unnecessary delay, which will be construed as an election not to pre-empt. Although the defendant as DW 01 stated that no sharer of the suit land was willing to purchase the suit land, such a plea is not substantiated by evidence on record. 

The materials on record thus show that there is sufficient and unimpeachable evidence to on the fact that the plaintiff had made 'talab-i-mowasibat' and thereafter, without any unreasonable delay, 'talab-i-ishhad' in the presence of two witnesses. There are other highly technical rules about the presence of witnesses and the nature of the evidence that they should give with regard to the second demand. This requirement is also found to be met with sufficient evidence on record. On the other hand, the defendant's side led no convincing evidence on the sheer fact that the plaintiff did not make the requisite talabs required to enforce the right of pre-emption.  As a result, nothing contrary evidence is available on record to such propositions. Accordingly, it is held that where there has been no such delay, for which the pre-emptor was not entitled to sustain his claim for pre-emption.

Moreover, on perusal of the materials on record, it appears that the plaintiff also claims that the suit land is very essential for the plaintiff. The plaintiff has been in possession over a part of the suit lands of the R.S. plot no. 578 that is over the plot in question. The plaintiff and his family members are residing there on the suit land making there doweling house for more than 60 years. There lies the grave of the father of the plaintiff and some other relatives of the plaintiff and a bamboo clam over the suit lands. Therefore, as the claim goes on, the suit is necessary for the plaintiff to get back by way of pre-emption under Mohammedan. Besides, the plaintiff claims that he has no more land than 8/10 bighas. Therefore, as nothing contrary is proved as such, there appears no legal bar or otherwise legal disqualification to get the disputed land by the plaintiff. Furthermore, in this suit for pre-emption, the whole of the interest is claimed; not a part of the estate sold against the pre-emptor. Hence, he is also not found to be hit by any other legal disqualifications.

Considering all of the points discussed above, it is decided that the suit is maintainable in the present form and manner. As such, the plaintiff may get relief as prayed for. Therefore, all these issues are decided in the plaintiff’s favor. In consideration and cognizance of the petitions, facts, surrounding circumstances, submitted evidence both oral and documentary on record and relevant laws, it appears to the Court that the suit deserves to be decreed on the contest.

The court fee paid is correct. 

Hence, it is ordered that the suit be decreed in preliminary on contest against the defendant No. 01 and ex parte against the rest without any order as to costs. It is hereby ordered that the pre-emptor will get the suit land described in the schedule to the plaint by way of pre-emption upon depositing the purchased money amounting to TK as specified in the suit deed into the court without delay. In case the plaintiff fails to make said deposit, the suit shall stand dismissed. 

(Composed and corrected by me)



continue reading Decreeing judgement passed in the O.C. suit No. 24/2013 (pre-emption under the Mohammadan Law)

18 November 2021

Dismissal Order in a Pre-emption Case under the 1893 Partition Act

 The record is taken up for passing necessary order. This is a suit for partition under sections 2 and 6 of the Partition Act, 1893. Perused the plaint, deposition of the plaintiff as P.W- 01, the documentary shreds of evidence marked as exhibits No. 01-08, and the case record.

2. The plaintiff’s succinct fact can be encapsulated in the way that the suit land is a pond which is sold to defendant No. 01 who is a stranger to the suit lands. The plaintiff argued that the defendant’s intrusion as a stranger purchaser into their ejmali property causes distraction disruptively to its enjoyment. He also maintains that the disputed pond is not worth being partitioned. Since he is a co-sharer to that, he manifested his purchasing desire and prayed for getting the disputed pond from the defendant under sections 2 and 6 of the Partition Act, 1893.

3. Upon considering the impugned fact and the adduced pieces of evidence, it appears that the PW-01 asserted that the suit property is a pond; and this discourse is clearly supported by the Ex. No. 01. It is also evident that the defendant is a stranger transferee, whereas the plaintiff is a co-sharer to the disputed holding. It is unambiguously the court’s view that the suit property is a divisible pond. Pragmatically, a pond is divisible, and a division of the same can reasonably or conveniently be made. Conspicuously, even a layman’s mind can grasp the sheer possibility of a fact that ‘shares’ of a given pond is also distributable among its holders. In cognizance of the materials on record, nothing is proved to be contrary to this proposition.

4. In legal parlance, it is well established that in the absence of a finding that a division of the property cannot reasonably or conveniently be made, action cannot be taken under the referred provisions of law. It is sheer ratiocination to hold that section 2 of the 1893 Partition Act is amenable to be invoked only when the partition of the suit land is impracticable, impossible, and uneconomic in its’ very nature.

5. The statutory epithet of section 2 of the Partition Act, ‘a division of the property cannot reasonably or conveniently be made’ contemplates that if it appears to the court that because of the nature of the property or of any other exceptional circumstances, a division of the property cannot conveniently be made; and that a sale of property and distribution of the proceeds would be more beneficial for all the share-holders, the Court may direct sale of the property and a distribution of the assets. The Court has the inherent power to order a sale instead of a partition in such a condition. But so far as the instant suit is concerned, the plaintiff cannot overcome this legal threshold.

6. The principle underlying this section is that a partition should not be made if the property's intrinsic value is destroyed thereby. The plaintiff turned up before the court not for mere division of the suit property. Even he did not take legal recourse for pre-empting the suit pond even though if a portion or share of a holding is sold to a stranger thereto, that share or portion is preemptible. Moreover, the sale which a court directing partition can order under this sections only for that of a complete share; not of a portion thereof. The plaintiff also gets entwined within legal knots which derails him from the passage of the relief prayed for.

In the background of the findings described above and in consideration and cognizance of the petitions, facts, surrounding circumstances, submitted evidence both oral and documentary on record and relevant laws, it appears to the Court that the plaintiff has not been successful in proving his case under the provision he brought in the instant suit which is found not maintainable in its present form. Thus, the suit deserves to be dismissed. As such, it is decided that the plaintiff may not get the relief as prayed for.

        Court fee paid is sufficient. Hence, it is ordered that the suit be dismissed ex parte against the defendants without costs. 

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