Showing posts with label Judgement. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Judgement. Show all posts

26 June 2022

Judgement passed in the other class No. 61/2015 (Declaration of Title)

District: Rajshahi

In the Court of the Senior Assistant Judge, Mohonpur, Rajshahi

Present: - Md. Abdul Malek, Senior Assistant Judge

Other Class Suit No. 61/2015 

Mr. Md. Nilchad (Plaintiff) Versus Md. Yakub (Defendant).

 

The suit’s trial gets ended and the argument is heard.

In the presence of...

 

And having stood for consideration to this day, the Court delivered the following judgment: This is a suit for declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to the landed property described in the schedule to the plaint through adverse possession.

The Plaint in the nutshell:

The landed property described in the schedule to the plaint has been in possession of the plaintiff from the lifetime of their predecessor over a period of 40 years by way of adverse possession of the suit lands. Actually, there was an oral exchange transactions between the fathers of the plaitifff and defendants. In that exchange, the defendants’ father took 16 decimal of lands comprising plot No. 150 of the SA khatian No. 52, and the plaintiff’s father took the suit lands. Nevertheless, RS record was wrongly prepared in the name of the defendants’ father Shahban. In fact, although the RS recorded tenant of the landed property described in the schedule to the plaint is one Shahban, the father of the defendants, they are completely out of the possession of the suit lands over 40 years. Even the predecessor of the plaintiffs attempted to take possession of the suit lands mentioning such RS record, but the plaintiffs' father drove them away from the suit lands.  But all of a sudden, the defendant made threats for dispossessing the plaintiffs from the suit lands on 10/05/2015, and hence, the plaintiff instituted the suit and invoked the court’s jurisdiction as prayed for.

The Written Statement in brief:

The Defendants contested the suit by filing a written statement denying the material averments made in the plaint. He contended therein, inter alia, that suit is the defect of parties, barred by limitation, and not maintainable in present form. Besides, the very suit’s facts are falsified that produce no cause of action and thus, is legally untenable, unjustifiable; and dismissible in law.

The SA recorded tenant of the landed property described in the schedule to the plaint is one Shahban Soardar and Shobhan Sardar. They were in possession of the suit lands on the basis of oral partitions. The RS record was prepared in the name of Shahban, the father of the plaintiffs, against 15 decimal of the suit lands comprised in the RS khatian No. 170. While in the exclusive possession of the suit lands, Shahban Sardar died leaving behind the plaintiffs, who were then placed in possession thereof. But after the plaintiff dispossessed them from the suit lands in the first half of the year of 2013, the defendants lodged an allegation with the concerned Union Parishod on 16/04/2013 but got no positive results from there. The plaintiff also made threats to them for not instituting any lawsuit in the regular court. Accordingly, the plaintiffs acquire no title to the suit lands. Hence, the suit is liable to be dismissed with costs.

Issues:

The pleadings of the parties are considered. As such, looking forward to determining the matters in controversy, the already framed issues are reframed under Rule 5 of Order 14 of the 1908 Code of Civil Procedure in the following way:


1.      Whether the suit is maintainable in the present form and manner.

2.     Whether the suit suffers from the defect of party. 

3.     Whether the plaintiffs have acquired title to the suit land.

4.     Whether the plaintiffs may get relief as prayed for.


Findings and Decisions

As proof of the claims, the plaintiff examined 04 witnesses and produced for the court's inspection documentary shreds of evidence which are marked as Exhibit No. 1. Defendants also examined 02 witnesses and produced documents marked as exhibit Nos. Ka-Gha. Heard the argument of the learned advocates appearing for both the parties.


Issue No. 2:

Pleading is a statement of claims. For every cause of action or relief, there must have a foundation in the pleadings. The purpose of Pleadings is to pinpoint the matters of controversy between the contending parties for enabling them to meet their respective claims. The relevant law in this respect is well-settled so far. On perusal of the suit record, it appears before the Court that in absence of anything contrary to it, the plaintiffs impleaded all heirs of the RS recorded tenant in the suit. In addition, except averments made in pleadings, no party to the suit raised any point as to the fact that the suit is bad for parties, and there is no materials on record that demonstrates the non-joinder of parties to the suit. Hence, this issue is decided in favor of the Plaintiffs.


Issue No. 3:  

It is admitted that the defendant is out of the possession of the suit lands and now, the plaintiff is in the possession of that landed property. Since the plaintiffs are claiming their rights by way of adverse possession, the burden of proof in respect to adverse possession is on them (for they claim that they have acquired title to the suit lands by way of adverse possession). As per Article 142 (and 144 respectively) of the 1908 Limitation Act, the plaintiff can only take a plea of adverse possession only if he has adversely to the defendant been in the physical possession of the property for the last 12 years and the defendant’s right under section 28 of the Limitation Act is extinguished. Since the plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law, there are some required elements for an adverse possession to be effective.

03. In a case of adverse possession of land, these aspects are to be taken into consideration: the plaintiffs’ possessor must have actually entered the property and must have exclusive possession of the property; the possession must be “open and notorious”; the possession must be adverse to the rightful owner and under a claim of right; and the possession must be “continuous” for the statutory period. More specifically, the plaintiffs claiming adverse possession must demonstrate (a) on what date, he came into possession; (b) what was the nature of his possession; (c) whether his possession was open, exclusive, continuous and undisturbed; (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) whether the factum of possession was known and hostile to the true owner.

04. On perusal of the materials available on record, it becomes trite to say that the plaintiffs appear to have claimed that they are in the exclusive possession of the suit lands over a period of 40 years. Interestingly, the defendants admitted [vide DW-01] in ways that currently, the plaintiffs are in possession of 15 decimal lands comprised in the RS plot No. 203. But they (plaintiffs) don't admit the plaintiff's possession in the suit lands before the year of 2013. As a result, on perusal of the shred of evidence adduced by the PW-01 and DW-01, it first becomes evident that the plaintiffs are now in “actual physical” possession and “not merely constructive” possession over the land.

05. Secondly, the plaintiffs further have proved that they have the requisite ingredient of animus possidendi (intention to possess) while claiming ownership by taking the plea of adverse possession. Hostile Possession is a kind of possession that is without the consent of the owner and the assertion of which conflicts with the property ownership interests of the owner. Moreover, since animus possidendi is necessary, possession does not become adverse when the intention to hold adversely is wanting. In our case, the materials on record vividly suggest that the plaintiffs holding the suit property by way of adverse possession must have published his intention to deny the right of the real owner, and such an intention of adverse possession is within the notice, knowledge of the defendant. Hence, it is also established with a credible piece of evidence that the plaintiff’s possession is “open, known and hostile” to the actual owner (defendants).

06. Now, consider whether his possession was exclusive, undisturbed, and "continuous" for the statutory period. In this respect, oral testimony could be instrumental to make a decision thereon. The PW-01 stated that the landed property described in the schedule to the plaint has been in possession of the plaintiff from the lifetime of their predecessor over a period of 40 years by way of adverse possession of the suit lands. In the inception, there was an oral exchange transaction between the fathers of the plaintiffs and defendants. By way of that exchange, the defendants' father took 16 decimal of lands comprising plot No. 150 of the SA khatian No. 52, and the plaintiff’s father took the suit lands. Subsequently, the RS record was wrongly prepared in the name of the defendants’ father Shahban. The plaintiffs thus claims that although the RS recorded tenant of the landed property described in the schedule to the plaint is the father of the defendants, Shahban, they (defendants) are completely out of the possession of the suit lands for over 40 years.

07. In evidence, the plaintiff-side depends on the premise that the suit landed property has been in possession of the plaintiff from the lifetime of their predecessor by way of adverse possession of the suit lands; and that period already becomes over a period of 40 years. Apparently, although the plaintiffs mention no starting point of adverse possession, they admitted [PW-01] that the defendants made threats to them for dispossession from the suit lands on 10.05.2015. So, the statutory period could be reckoned reversely from the ending point of the plaintiffs’ alleged peaceful and continuous possession.

08. The PW-01 further claims in his evidence that he has himself been cultivating the suit lands, by establishing betel fields the last five years. He also added that his father cultivated paddy on the suit lands too. But the PW-03 stated that one “Jamal” establishes the betel field upon agreement. The other two witnesses [PW-02 and 03] only certify that there is a betel field on the suit lands and the plaintiffs are in possession of it. So, it is noticeable that none supported the plaintiffs (PW-01) on the fact of their predecessor’s paddy cultivation over a certain period. What becomes vivid is that PW-01 and PW-03 added a fact of betel field, which has been installed just five or six years ago. Interestingly, PW-03 deposed as such in September of 2019 and at best six-year back goes in 2013. The defendants in their pleading conspicuously stated that the plaintiffs made them out of possession in the first half of 2013. Even, the DW-02 added that the plaintiffs along with “Jamal” had dispossessed the defendants 6/7 years ago. Accordingly, there arises a material point that goes antithesis to the plaintiffs’ proposition.

09. Moreover, both PW-03 and DW-02 stated that one “Jamal” establishes the betel field upon agreement. Both are the most competent witnesses as they have lands adjacent to the suit lands. As aforesaid, the DW-02 added that the plaintiffs along with “Jamal” had dispossessed the defendants 6/7 years ago. The fact is that Mr. “Jamal” currently cultivating the suit lands is “not examined” before the court. Although the plaintiffs’ witness PW-03 made an addendum of Jamal’s episode, non-examination of Mr. Jamal before the court becomes mischievous to the plaintiffs under section 103 of the 1872 Evidence Act (the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence). So, it is deducible that the plaintiffs have not been able to discharge such an onus legally cast on him.

10. Even, if the plaintiff’s evidence in this regard is considered as it were, the plaintiffs' positions become unsupportive with another witness like the PW-03. Plus, the non-examination of Mr. Jamal procreates adverse presumption against the plaintiffs under section 114 (G) of the 1872 Evidence Act. For that reason, there arises another fact that also goes antithetical to the plaintiffs’ discourse of evidence. That being such, it is decisive that the evidence of the plaintiff coterie carries them nowhere in the proof of their claim of exclusive, continuous, and undisturbed possession for over the statutory period. The legal position counsels that the possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in the extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, and hostile and continued over the statutory period, which is 12 years from the date of alleged dispossession [vide Art. 142 of the 1908 Limitation Act]. Hence, the whole fabric of the materials on record persuades the court to opine that the plaintiffs should suffer from such an annihilating position.

11. Furthermore, on careful consideration of the materials on record, it also transpires that in the case of declaration of title based on adverse possession, material consideration is the question of adverse possession is to be determined on the basis of the specific averment made in the plaint. In our case, the plaintiffs' pleading enumerates that an oral exchange was executed between the fathers of both plaintiffs and defendants. In that exchange transaction, the defendants' father took 16 decimal of lands comprising plot No. 150 of the SA khatian No. 52, and the plaintiff’s father took the suit lands. In cross-examination, the PW01 stated that Saibot, Kamal, and Ashraf know about that exchange. Saibot deposed as PW-02 who testified that he was yet to be borne at the time of exchange. PW-03 & PW-04 having lands just adjacent to the suit lands are found totally silent about the plaintiffs’ specific fact- “oral exchange”. So, the PW-01 remains unsupported by other witnesses adduced by him. In addition, since RS record was prepared in the name of the defendant's predecessor one Shahban, not in the name of the plaintiff’s predecessor. Consequently, the plaintiffs are precluded from claiming the presumptive value of the latest Record of Rights.

12. Interestingly, the DW-01 convincingly states in his cross-examination a basis of his dispossession from the suit lands, that is to say, the suit lands situate on the western side adjacent to the other lands of the plaintiffs. As such, it appears that the so-called basis of adverse possession on the specific averment made in the plaint has not been proved with credible and weighty evidence. Additionally, there comes in the pertinence of the dicta observed by the Privy Council [vide 28 AIR 1934 PC 23] that “the ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be “nec vi nec clam, nec precario” (without force, without secrecy, without permission). Pertinently, the use of “force” to dispossess a true owner seemingly affects the fine-terrain of the court’s discretionary and equitable relief.  Pertinently, another cardinal principle also resounds here that although the plea of adverse possession can be used both as a sword and as a shield, a person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favor, simply because, he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner [vide 2015 (5) ALT 634]. Thus, it is for the plaintiff to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary for adverse possession.

13. However, it also appears that the defendants did not take the plea that the plaintiffs are now in possession, by way of permissive possession, or as the co-owner of the land claiming ownership by way of adverse possession, or, as part performance in according to an agreement to sell as provided under Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act, 1882. So, any discussion about these points fairly stands outside the ambit of the present context.

14. In fact, the court understands that adverse possession is also known as squatter’s rights. Basically, the term ‘adverse possession’ is not defined anywhere in the Limitation Act, as it is not a positive right and merely a negative and consequential right, which is based on the negligence or inaction on the part of the rightful owner of the land to come forward and take legal recourse in case any person is in hostile possession of his land. The relevant law is that only having long continuous possession is not enough to perfect title by adverse possession and all other ingredients, that are hostile, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession for 12 years, are also necessary. So, since the plaintiffs are trying to defeat the rights of true owner (defendants), it is for them to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. But here, the court is of the view that the plaintiffs are not found to be able to prove and establish their adverse possession of the suit lands.

15.  No doubt, this suit is for declaration of title to the suit land on the basis of adverse possession. In short, title is a legal term that refers to an interest and ownership of something. In jurisprudential sense, title to property thus refers to ownership of the property, meaning that you have the rights to use that property. On the other hands, ownership to lands refers to an aggregate of all the rights a person has with those lands that he owns. Particularly, the concept of ownership flows from that of possession [vide A Textbook of Jurisprudence, G. W. Paton, (1973) OUP, p. 539, 546]. Accordingly, it can be said that when you have ownership, then you have only ownership; and when you have title, then you have ownership as well as title. Here is the germane fact is that unless the enjoyment of the property is accompanied by adverse animus for a statutory period, mere possession would not be sufficient to mature the title to the property by adverse possession. Therefore, it is the courts’ view that although the plaintiff’s current possession over the suit lands in entirety has been proved with credible and weighty evidence; they are in legal parlance not adjudged to be entitled to the suit lands by way of adverse possession.

In dispelling ambiguity, it is also pertinent to mention that it is not necessary to enter upon a detail discussion of the question of onus. The reason is simple: the whole fabric of the evidential edifice is before the court; which finds no difficulty in arriving at a conclusion with regard to the issues in discussion. So, in considering the aforesaid facts, relevant laws, and corroborative evidence as well as encompassing conditions, it appears to the court that the plaintiff’s title through adverse possession to the suit lands is not proved and established with unimpeachable evidence. Hence, this issue is not settled in the plaintiff’s favor.


Issue No. 1 and 4:

For brevity, convenience and correlation, all the issues are taken together in discussing the matter in the suit. These issues are certainly crucial in point of laws and facts for being related to the questions of the maintainability and eligibility for getting relief sought for in the Plaint. On perusal of the suit materials, the court is of opinion that this is a competent court to grant relief as prayed for in this suit. But, as aforesaid, since it appears to the Court that the plaintiffs have not been able to prove on their own strength with credible pieces of evidence that the plaintiffs have acquired title to the suit land by way of adverse possession, the court finds adequate reasons to hold that the instant suit is not maintainable in its present form and manner. Furthermore, as such, because of all of the issues discussed above, it is thus held that since the plaintiffs have not been successful in proving all issues in their favor, the plaintiffs are not adjudged to be entitled to get relief as prayed for. And thus, it is decided that the suit deserves to be dismissed on contest.


Court fee paid is sufficient.

Hence,

it is ORDERED that

the suit be dismissed on contest against the defendants without any order as to costs.

            (Composed and corrected by me)

continue reading Judgement passed in the other class No. 61/2015 (Declaration of Title)

Judgement passed in the Misc. Case No. 35/2015 (Pre-emption)

BANGLADESH FORM NO. 3701

HIGH COURT FORM NO. (J) 2

HEADING OF JUDGEMENT IN ORIGINAL SUIT/CASE 

District: Rajshahi

In the Court of the Senior Assistant Judge, Mohonpur, Rajshahi

Present:  Md. Abdul Malek, Senior Assistant Judge

13 July, 2022

Miscellaneous Case No. 35/2015 (Pre-emption) 

Mr. Sri Aujoy Sarkar....................…...Petitioner

Versus

Mr. Sri Bipod Chandro Shaha and Others.......Opposite Parties

The suit/case’s trial ended and arguments are heard

In the presence of

Mr...........................…………….……Learned Advocate for the Petitioner

Mr.....................................…. Learned Advocate for the Opposite Party

And having stood for consideration to this day, the Court delivered the following judgment: This is an application under section 96 of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950. The petitioner filed the case for getting the case lands by way of pre-emption as described in the schedule to the application.

The application in the nutshell:

The recorded tenant of the RS khatian Nos. 253 and 254 was one Zogendronath Pramanik, who died leaving behind his spouse one Srimoti Khiroda Sundari. Srimoti Khiroda Sundari transferred 02.06 acres lands to the father of the petitioner Shushil Kumar via a deed No. 1250 dated 27.02.1983. Shushil Kumar died leaving behind the petitioner Aujoy Sarkar, Bijoy Kumar Sarkar (O.P. No. 02) and Aujit Kumar Sarkar as heirs. The O.P. No. 03 is a son of Aujit Kumar Sarkar. The Petitioner pre-emtors and the seller proforma opposite parties are co-sharers by inheritance. Suddenly, the opposite party No. 02 surreptitiously sold the scheduled lands in question to the opposite party No. 01 without serving any notice or furnishing any information upon the petitioners whatsoever. Subsequently, the petitioner came to know about the disputed sale when the O.P. No. 01 wanted to take possession of the lands in question 25/07/2015 and definitely on 30/07/2015 after obtaining the certified copy of the disputed sale. The petitioner prayed for pre-empting the lands scheduled to the petition and hence is the case.

Written objections in short:

The Purchaser Opposite Party (hereinafter, O.P.) No. 01 contested the case by filing the written objection, denying the material averments made in the pre-emptors’ petition. They contended inter alia that the very petition is legally untenable, barred by limitation, and hit by the defect of parties. The contesting Opposite Party stated that the recorded tenant of the RS khatian Nos. 253 and 254 was one Zogendronath Pramanik, who died leaving behind his spouse one Srimoti Khiroda Sundari. Srimoti Khiroda Sundari transferred the lands to one Shushil Kumar, who died leaving behind the petitioner Aujoy Sarkar, Bijoy Kumar Karkar (O.P. No. 02) and Aujit Kumar Sarkar as heirs. Upon request by the O.P. No. 02, he purchased the lands in question in cognizance of the many others, including the petitioner. 

He also stated that the Petitioners were aware of the disputed sale and cognizant of the disputed deed from the very inception. He has mutated the suit lands after the said purchase. Accordingly, separate holding is opened and taxes are being paid accordingly, as well as an improvement is also made to the case lands subsequently. Additionally, since the Petitioners filed the case for unlawful gain and based the same on false and fabricated statements; they (the Petitioners) are not entitled to get back the case lands as they prayed for.

Points for Determination:

Considering the parties’ petition and written objection, the points for determination are fixed with a modification in the following way:

1)      Whether the case is maintainable in the present form and manner. 

2)    Whether the case is bad for the defect of parties.

3)     Whether the case is barred by limitation

4)    Whether the petitioners are co-sharers by inheritance in the holding in question.

5)     Whether the petitioners may get relief as prayed for.

Discussions and the Decisions:

In proof of the claims, the petitioner examined two oral witnesses as PW 01-02, and produced documentary evidence marked as exhibit Nos. 01-03). On the other side, the Opposite Party No. 01 also examined oral witnesses as OPWs 01-03 and put forward documents marked exhibit Nos. Ka-Kha.

Point for Determination No. 02:

All the co-shares are necessary parties in a pre-emption case. Waiver of the right is one thing, but defeating the right by deliberate omission in the pre-emption application is a different thing. So, pre-empting right is not absolute, but subject to the right of other co-sharers. Since the cause of actions for a pre-empting right accrues to those all who are entitled to file an application for pre-emption against the transferee, impleading necessary parties are considered as mandatory and not directory one. Consequently, the Omission does not absolve the pre-emptor of his mandatory duty to implead them by ascertaining necessary particulars [vide 4 BLD (AD) 27].  Thus, an omission of a necessary party is vitiating and fatal to pre-emption cases.

On perusal of the case record, it appears before the Court that with regard to the plea of defect of parties for the instant case, the opposite parties produced discourses as to the omission of a necessary party in pleading and particularly mentioned the name of some purchasers not made party to the case. It is the plea of the O.P. No. 01 that they (“purchasers”) are “necessary party” in this miscellaneous proceeding.

 Consider the explicit provisions of the relevant law. The combined reading of the provisions enshrined in section 96 (2) & (4) of the 1950 State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, all other co-sharer tenants “by inheritance” of the holding and the purchaser shall be made parties. It is admitted that Shushil Kumar died leaving behind Aujoy Sarkar (petitioner), Bijoy Kumar Sarkar (O.P. No. 02) and Aujit Kumar Sarkar as heirs. The O.P. No. 03 is a son of Aujit Kumar Sarkar. So, considering the exhibited documents and the depositions given in examination-in-chief as PW- 01 and DW-01, it appears that all co-sharer tenants by inheritance in the holding are made parties to the instant case. It is, therefore, decided that the Petitioner has successfully impleaded all the necessary parties in the case, and thus, the case seems to imply that the same is free from the defect of parties. Hence, this point is also decided in favor of the Petitioner.

Point for Determination No. 04:

As aforesaid, it is admitted the O.P No. 01 in his pleading that the recorded tenant of the RS khatian Nos. 253 and 254 was one Zogendronath Pramanik, who died leaving behind his spouse one Srimoti Khiroda Sundari. Srimoti Khiroda Sundari transferred the lands to one Shushil Kumar, who died leaving behind three sons, Aujoy Sarkar, Bijoy Kumar Sarkar (O.P. No. 02) and Aujit Kumar Sarkar. Here, Aujoy Kumar Sarkar instituted the case as a co-sharer; and Bijoy Kumar Sarkar and the legal representative of Aujit Kumar are made parties to the case as O.P. No. 02-03. Even, on perusal of the pleading of the parties and the testimony of the DW-01 (vide cross-examination), it further appears that the instant petitioner turns into coherer tenants by inheritance of the holding. The PW-01 as well as DW-01 along with other witnesses supported this premise in many ways that the current petitioners are also co-sharers by inheritance. 

05. However, the O.P. also bases his plea of defence in ways that after the demise of Shushil Kumar Sarkar, the share(s) of the case lands are allotted to his heirs on oral partition. But, what transpires on the materials on record reveals that no partition either through a registered deed or otherwise is proven to be complete so far, as well as the tenancy of the holding is yet to be split up through mutation regarding the lands in question before the institution of this case. Surprisingly, the O.P. No. 01 admittedly appears to be a stranger to the disputed tenancy in holding.

06. Moreover, the OPs further robustly claimed that the pre-emptor is not a co-sharer in the holding in question for a separate holding has been opened in the name of the OP No. 01 after his disputed purchase, and on the basis of which, rents are being paid by them. In evidence, it appears that the O.P. No. 01 places no documentary piece of evidence in support of his case in denial of the petitioners’ co-shareship due to the alleged separate holding. It is no denying that the process of separation or sub-division of holding is altogether a different thing and it shall have to be done only after observing the procedure as laid down in section 117c of the aforesaid Act of 1950. Besides, '[a] non-notified co-sharer of the holding which was divided would remain co shares of the holding as if there was no sub-division of holding relating to the claim.' As such, these premises require to minutely be scrutinized on our purposes.

07. On scrutiny of materials on records, it appears that there is no proof of a separate holding opened with regard to the lands disclosed in the deed in the question of pre-emption. Accordingly, the plea of splitting up of the tenancy of the holding holds no water in legal parlance. The relevant law is well-spoken that when separate Khatians are prepared in the names of the original co-sharers, that co-sharer in whose names separate Khatian have been prepared will cease to be co-sharers of the original holding. [Vide 13 MLR (AD) 144]. Therefore, the court finds no convincing or unimpeachable evidence that is independently led by the O.P. in support of the alleged extinguishment of the petitioner’s co-shareship in the holding in question.  Therefore, it is the court’s view that the Petitioners are “co-sharer tenants by inheritance” in the holding in question.

Point for Determination No. 01, 03 & 05:

These issues are taken together for the sake of brevity, convenience, and interrelation. As per section 96(1) of the 1950 State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, a pre-emption case is to be filed within two months of the service of notice under section 89; or if no notice has been served under that section, within two months of the “date of knowledge” of the disputed sale. The relevant law envisages that the date of obtaining a certified copy of the sale deed will be considered as the 'date of knowledge' contemplated as a 'complete and definite date of knowledge as to the disputed sale' in case of non-service of notice [vide 15 MLR 207, 9 BLD 197]. On perusal of the materials on record, it appears that there is no proof in the support of the service of notice as aforesaid. Accordingly, this application for pre-emption will not be barred if it is filed within two months from the date of knowledge for no notice is served under section 89. Hence, the date of initial knowledge is to be relaxed; instead, the date of definite knowledge is to purposively be considered here.

09. In pleading, the petitioner claims that he came to know about the disputed sale when the O.P. No. 01 wanted to take possession of the lands in question on 25/07/2015 and he also definitely got informed of the same after making an educated person read over it to them after obtaining the certified copy of the disputed sale. In evidence, it occurs on record that the petitioners concurred with the same propositions with sufficient explanation as to how he came to know about the disputed sale [vide PW-01]. However, the opposite side objected to the reckoning of the limitation on account of the date of knowledge, both in pleading and in cross-examination. The O.P. underscores (OPW-01) that they purchased the lands in the case jote in the presence of Bijoy, Salam, Goutam, Aujoy, Mukul and Shahidul and made an improvement to the case lands subsequently. They claim that the petitioner had known about the disputed sale and when they declined to purchase the case lands in their presence.

On close perusal of the testimony led by the opposite parties, it seemingly appears that the OPW-01 reiterated the same in his cross-examination; but it also occurs that his other witnesses DW 02-03 did not convincingly support his testimony, simply because the OP did not particularly, on one hand, examine Bijoy, Salam, Goutam and Mukul, except Shahidul (OPW-02) who he himself went to Bijoy’s home with Apod. Here, Bijoy is the seller and Apod is the purchased of the case lands. As a result, it is deducible that the said event happened at Bijoy’s home, not at the home of the petitioner Ajoy Sardar. As a result, it cogently transpires that the petitioner has come before the court with more weighty evidence than the opposite party did as to the knowledge of the sale.

11. Moreover, the OP side additionally presented that the petitioner had prior knowledge about the disputed sale and narrated a particular fact: the marriage of Tripti Rani, a daughter of the seller, and a niece of the pre-emptor. But as it transpires on the materials on record that, although the very fact is ostensibly relevant, it did establish no robust connection to the propriety of the pre-emptor’s date of knowledge. The court, therefore, finds no reason for not being satisfied with the standard of proofs led by the petitioner on the point that the whole fabric of the evidential edifice convinces the court to hold that the instant miscellaneous case (pre-emption) was filed within the prescribed period of time. In view of the above propositions of law and facts, it is, therefore, found that the case has been filed within the period of time prescribed in law; and thus, the same is not barred by law. Hence, this point for determination No. 03 is decided in favor of the Petitioner.

12. Furthermore, it is also noticeable that the OP side clearly claims that the lands in question are not pre-emptible for they are not agricultural lands. But, it surprisingly occurs that the O.P. side also mentions in pleading that the land class is vita and there have been built betel field and cluster or clump of bamboos, and that is the improvement made by them therein. Besides, both side admitted in their testimony that there is a betel field and cluster or clump of bamboos on the case lands. So, such a plea holds no water.

13. Then, it is also noticeable that as a matter of expediency, section 96 (11) of the 1950 State Acquisition and Tenancy Act can be considered and discussed here for lawful adjudication of the instant case. Section 96 (11) articulates that ‘nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to homestead land. Hopefully, the definition of the term ‘homestead’ is found in section 2(14) of the aforesaid Act. It runs as “homestead” means a dwelling house with the land under it, together with any courtyard, garden, tank, place of worship and private burial or cremation ground attached and appertaining to such dwelling house, and includes any out-buildings used for the purpose of enjoying the dwelling house or for purpose connected with agriculture or horticulture and such lands within well-defined limits, whether vacant or not, as are treated to be appertaining thereto. According to these provisions, it is unquestionable that homestead land is not pre-emptible. So, a vita having no connection to attributes mentioned in this definition is in no way homestead. The materials available on record suggest that the lands in question is not, in legal parlance, homestead. Besides, both side admitted in their testimony that there is a betel field and cluster or clump of bamboos on the case lands. So, the application stands outside the bar of the provisions enumerated in section 96 (16) of the 1950 State Acquisition and Tenancy Act.

As a result, since the application is barred by limitation, the instant case is not maintainable in the present form and manner. As such, since the petitioners are held to be co-sharer of holding in the tenancy and the application is not otherwise barred, they may get relief as prayed for. In consideration and cognizance of the petitions, facts, surrounding circumstances, submitted shred of shreds of evidence, both oral and documentary, on record, and relevant laws, it appears to the Court that the application deserves to be disallowed on contest. 

 

Court fee paid is correct.

Hence,

it is  ordered

that the pre-emption application be allowed on contest against the Opposite Party No.1 without any order as to costs. The pre-emptor will get scheduled lands by way of pre-emption. The Opposite Party No. 1 is allowed to withdraw the money deposited in their credit. The OP No. 1 directed to execute and register a sale deed in respect of case lands in favour of the Petitioner within 60 days from this order provided that no tax, duty or fee shall be payable on such registration. In default, the Petitioner may get the same through Court in accordance with the law. 

(Composed and corrected by me)

continue reading Judgement passed in the Misc. Case No. 35/2015 (Pre-emption)

25 June 2022

Judgment passed in the other class suit No. 62/2018

HEADING OF JUDGEMENT IN ORIGINAL SUIT/CASE

District: Rajshahi

In the Court of the Senior Assistant Judge, Mohonpur, Rajshahi

Present: - Md. Abdul Malek, Senior Assistant Judge

Other Class Suit No. 62/2018

Mst. Hameda Bibi (Plaintiff) Versus Mr. Riaz Uddin (Defendant).

 

The suit's trial ended and the argument was heard.

In the presence of................................

 

And having stood for consideration to this day, the Court delivered the following judgment: This is a suit for a permanent injunction regarding the landed property described in the schedule to the plaint.

The Plaint in the nutshell:

The recorded tenant of the suit lands described as RS khatian No. 223 in the schedules to the plaint was one Nurjahan Beowa, who is the predecessor mother of the plaintiffs. After the demise of Nurjahan Beowa, the plaintiffs as his heirs got title to and possession in the suit landed property. The plaintiffs claim that they are now in exclusive possession of the suit land. Despite having no title to the suit land, the defendants made threats to the plaintiffs for dispossession from the suit lands, and hence the suit. The Plaintiffs claimed that the suit land belongs to them; and that is now under their possession. Hence, he is entitled to get relief as prayed for. 

The Written Statements in Brief:

The defendant No. 1 & 4-5 contested the suit by filing written statements denying the material averments made in the plaint. They contended therein, inter alia, that the suit not maintainable in the present form, has no cause of action and thus, is legally untenable, unjustifiable; and dismissible in law. Defendants stated that the recorded tenant of the suit lands described as RS khatian No. 223 in the schedules to the plaint was one Nurjahan Beowa, who transferred 0.84 acres of lands to her daughter Mrs. Jobeda Beowa via a registered deed of gift No. 5419/1999. Recorded tenant Nurjahan also transferred 0.10 acres of land to her daughter Jobeda Beowa via a registered deed No. 2842/2000. Then, Jobeda Beowa transferred 0.93 acres of land to defendant No. 01 Mr. Riaz Uddin via a registered deed No. 1707/2003. Some lawsuits were also brought into being regarding the suit lands and respective deeds; but, final courts’ decisions do not support the plaintiffs’ title to the suit lands.

Defendant No. 01 also transferred some lands to Defendant Nos. 4-5. Accordingly, the lands were mutated against the defendant’s name and land rents are being paid by him accordingly. In fact, the plaintiffs have no title as well as no exclusive possession of the suit land in its entirety. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have no cause of action and any rights to sue regarding the land in question and thus, the plaintiff's suit is not sustainable in the law. Hence, the suit will be dismissed.

Issues

In cognizance of the parties’ pleadings and the matters in controversy, the issues are reframed under Or. 14, R. 05 of the 1908 Code of Civil Procedure in the following way:

1.      Whether the suit is maintainable in the present form and manner.

2.      Whether the plaintiffs have prima facie title to the suit land.

3.      Whether the plaintiffs have exclusive possession of the suit land.

4.      Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief as prayed for?


Discussions and Decisions:

During the trial, the plaintiff examined 04 witnesses and produced documentary pieces of evidence marked as exhibits No. 1-3. Defendants examined 03 witnesses and produced documents marked as Exhibit No. Ka-Dha Arguments were heard from both parties after the conclusion of the trial of the suit.

Issue No. 02:

These issues are taken together for concision, convenience, and interrelation. No skepticism, it becomes high time to see through the plaintiffs’ prima facie title to the suit land envisaged in the Kha schedule. In proof of their prima facie title thereto, the plaintiffs narrated in ways that the recorded tenant of the suit lands described as RS khatian No. 223 [ext.: 01-02] in the schedules to the plaint was one Nurjahan Beowa, who is the predecessor mother of the plaintiffs. After the demise of Nurjahan Beowa, the plaintiffs as his heirs got title to and possession in the suit landed property.

06. On the contrary, the defendant No. 1 & 4-5 contended that the recorded tenant of the suit lands described as RS khatian No. 223 in the schedules to the plaint was one Nurjahan Beowa, who transferred 0.84 acres of lands to her daughter Mrs. Jobeda Beowa via a registered deed of gift No. 5419/1999[ext.: Cha]. Recorded tenant Nurjahan also transferred 0.10 acres of land to her daughter Jobeda Beowa via a registered deed No. 2842/2000. Then, Jobeda Beowa transferred 0.93 acres of land to defendant No. 01 Mr. Riaz Uddin via a registered deed No. 1707/2003[ext.: Chha]. It is also stated that defendant No. 01 also transferred some lands to Defendant Nos. 4-5 [ext.: Ja-Jha]. Accordingly, the lands were mutated against the defendant’s name and land rents are being paid by him as such [ext.: Tha-Da]. On perusal of the Exhibit Ka-Kha, it also appears that the defendants’ title to the suit lands in part has been established through the court’s verdicts. In giving testimony, the DW-01 evidently claims that they are entitled to 93 decimal lands out of the suit property.

07. Now, consider the scheduled property: RS khatian No. 223 [ext.: 01-02] scheduled to the plaint. The measurement of land comprised in this khatian is of 1.60 acres. It is now well settled that ‘in a suit for permanent injunction, the court need not enter into disputed title except to the extent that it would help the court in finding which of the parties have prima facei title and exclusive possession’ (vide 56 DLR Ad 22). In essence, ‘title’ is a legal term that refers to interest and ownership of something. In a jurisprudential sense, title to the property also refers to ‘ownership of the property", meaning that you have ‘the rights to use’ that property. Particularly, the concept of ownership flows from that of ‘possession’[vide A Textbook of Jurisprudence, G. W. Paton, (1973) OUP, p. 539, 546]. So, it is apparent that an investigation into the parties’ entitlement to the suit lands is clearly a matter of deep analysis and intense examination, which is fairly beyond the simpliciter suit’s preview. However, it could cogently be opined that there arises some good standing that demonstrates the plaintiffs’ prima facie title to the suit land, and thus, it is decided that the plaintiffs have successfully established their prima facie title to the suit landed property. Hence, it is decided that this issue is decided in the plaintiff’s favor.

 

Issue No. 03:

In pleading and evidence, the plaintiffs claim that they are now in exclusive possession of the suit land, and the PW-01 has deposed that they have eight old mango trees, 16 new mango trees, and a house built by the mother of plaintiff No. 01. The PW-01 claims that all plaintiffs are in exclusive possession in lands measuring 1.60 acres. It is the plaintiff’s case that despite having no title to the suit land, the defendants made threats to the plaintiffs for dispossession from the suit lands. The Plaintiffs thus claimed that since the suit land belongs to them and is now under their possession, they are entitled to get relief as prayed for. 

09. Now consider the adduced evidence in this respect. The PW-02 also stated that only plaintiff No. 01 Hameda is in possession of the suit. But the PW-03 stated in his examination-in-chief that only plaintiff Hamida is in possession; but in his cross-examination, he again said that plaintiff Hamida and Plaintiff Jobeda possess the lands in question. Both PWs 02-03 are found to be contradictory to each other, although they claim themselves to be adjacent to the suit lands. Furthermore, the PW-04 claims himself to be a cultivator on the suit lands, but he was unable to specify how much of lands he cultivates on behalf of plaintiff Hamida. More particularly, the PW-01 stated in his cross-examination that one Fozlu and Khorshed worked for them on the suit lands at the time of paddy harvest, but these two persons are not examined before the court. Consequently, in considering the discussion made hereinbefore, it also occurs that such contradictory assertions by the plaintiff’s witnesses fade away from their credibility, and thus, they are not found in harmony with the same sense and manner. Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot claim any support from them.

10. On the contrary, to substantiate the defendants’ possession, the DW-01 also asserted a similar proposition in evidence, even in addition to fact that defendant No. 01 and defendant No. 4-7 have also possession in the lands measuring 95 decimal out of the suit property. In cross-examination, the PW-01 also attempted to underscore the fact of his possession as such. The DW-02 also stated that he purchased 02 decimal lands, comprised in RS Plot No. 1953, from defendant No. 01 and now, has been in possession of that land. The DW-03 is also found to be walking in the shoe of the DW02. These witnesses are examined in cross-examination but nothing contradictory was unearthed by the plaintiff's side.

11. However, apart from oral testimony regarding de facto possessory evidence, there is also documentary evidence that talks about de jure possession of the parties. In cross-examination, the PW-01 admitted that he paid land tax in 2015 for 67 decimal lands, but he claims their possession in lands measuring 1.60 acres. She (PW-01) also asserted that they have also paid taxes but did not provide the same to the court for inspection. On the other hand, the defendant's side places some tax receipt and prostabito khatian looking forward to proving de jure possession of the suit lands [ext.: Tha-Da]. No doubt, the record of rights is evidence of present possession, meaning a record of physical possession at the time when it is prepared (vide 59 DLR 207; 07 ADC 945). In this way, it is cogent to opine that such a mutation also gives rise to a presumption that the defendants are also in possession of the suit land.  And the fact thus follows that the plaintiffs have not been able to rebut such a presumption.

12. Moreover, the plaintiff-side also underscores an order passed by the court of Addl. District Magistrate (Rajshahi) under section 144 (but the content of the case suggests it would be under section 145) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But the defendant side made robust objections to the admissibility of a criminal court’s judgment in a civil proceeding. In rejoinder, the plaintiff-side pleaded that the court of Addl. District Magistrate exercising jurisdictions under section 144 or 145 is a quasi-civil court. In fact, the general legal position is that “a criminal court’s finding of possession is not admissible in evidence in a civil suit” [vide 40 DLR 1988 271]. And the issue of inter-admissibility of judgments arising from different proceedings is governed by the 1872 Evidence Act. As per section 43 of the Act, judgment, order or decree are irrelevant other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41, and 42, unless the existence of such judgment, order, or decree is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provision of this Act. A test is whether the concept of res judicata would result as an outcome of the given proceeding, largely based upon the same premises. The dichotomy of legal systems indicates that an order of the aforesaid court exercising jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure may not result in a decree (if the case is successful) or operate as res judicata for a proceeding under the Code of Civil Procedure, this court is not prone to swim with the tide led by the plaintiff-side.  

13. Apart from the fact that the defendant-side places some latest documentary pieces of evidence, including prostabito khatian and tax receipts in proof of their possession in the suit land, as well as convincing oral testimony regarding their current possession, the defendant's side also placed some registered deeds in favor of their claims that they have good property deeds and documentation concerning the suit lands. On perusal of the documentary evidence marked exhibit stated above, it vividly transpires to the court that the defendant side produced more convincing and dependable materials than the plaintiff side. Therefore, the court holds that the pieces of evidence concerning the plaintiffs' possession in the suit lands lack practical certainty and reasonable propriety. In addition, it conspicuously admitted that the suit lands are admitted not yet to be allotted among the sharers by meets and bounds on partition [vide PW-01]. Hence, it is decided that the balance of preponderance towards the suit lands ‘possession goes against the plaintiffs so far.

14. In dispelling ambiguity, it is also pertinent to mention that it is not necessary to enter into a detailed discussion of the question of onus. The reason is simple: the whole fabric of the evidential edifice is before the court; which finds no difficulty in arriving at a conclusion about the issues in discussion. So, in considering the aforesaid facts, relevant laws, and corroborative evidence as well as encompassing conditions, it appears to the court that although the plaintiffs have been successful in establishing their prima facie title to the suit lands, they have failed to prove their exclusive possession therein. So, the issue at hand is not settled in favor of the plaintiffs.


Issues No. 01 & 04:

The essence of the suit's alleged cause of action displayed in the plaint reveals that the defendants made threats to the plaintiff for dispossessing the latter from the suit lands and thus, had caused interruption to the plaintiffs' exclusive possession of the suit property. There is thus no gainsaying that this is a suit for a permanent injunction. On perusal of the materials on record, it vividly appears that the plaintiff filed the suit before this court having jurisdiction with paying proper court fees and seeking a decree for perpetual injunction simpliciter. Section 54 of the 1877 Specific Relief Act recognizes any aggrieved person's right to file a lawsuit for such a relief as prayed for.

16. However, in the light of the discussion made hereinbefore, it becomes lucid that the plaintiffs have not been able to prove their exclusive possession in the specified lands scheduled to the plaint; instead, the defendants’ possession is also proven to be in the suit lands. In a suit for permanent injunction, the plaintiffs shall have to prove their exclusive possession of the suit land in order to get a decree [vide 7 BLC HCD 2002]. In our case, the plaintiffs have failed to prove their exclusive possession out of a vast plot, and that cannot be ascertained unless the suit lands are sufficiently specified and ascertained. Since the plaintiff has failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of law, they are not entitled to any decree even if they have some merits in the suit. Yet, this is not a suit for partition, where all sorts of legal questions regarding the suit lands could be resolved.

17. The general principle of evidence law is that “the burden lies on the Plaintiff to prove his case and he must succeed on his own strength only and not at the weakness of the adversary” [vide 3 BLC 6], and the weakness of the defence case does not entitle the plaintiff to get a decree [vide 06 BLC AD 2001]. It would also be verbose to reiterate that in a simple suit for permanent injunction with regard to a disputed landed property, relief is not available to a person who is not in possession’ (vide 43 DLR AD 215). Pertinently, an injunction cannot be granted in a case where the defendant has legal character as to title and possession in the suit property.

Therefore, in respect of the instant suit, the cumulative effect and cogency of legal inference help the court hold that since the plaintiffs have failed to entirely prove their exclusive possession in the suit lands, the plaintiffs have not sufficiently been able to prove their exclusive possession in the entire suit lands and a complicated question of title and possession is involved in the suit. It is decisive to the court that the suit is maintainable in its current form and manner. Accordingly, the Court is of the view that since all of these issues are not decided in the plaintiff’s favor, the instant suit is not a good fit for exercising the Court’s discretion in decreeing the same. As such, the Plaintiffs may not get relief as prayed for. As a result, the suit deserves to be dismissed on contest.

The court fee paid is sufficient.

Hence,

it is  ORDERED

that the suit be dismissed on the contest against defendants without costs.

            Composed and corrected by                                              

continue reading Judgment passed in the other class suit No. 62/2018