Showing posts with label Dismissal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Dismissal. Show all posts

26 June 2022

Judgement passed in the other class No. 61/2015 (Declaration of Title)

District: Rajshahi

In the Court of the Senior Assistant Judge, Mohonpur, Rajshahi

Present: - Md. Abdul Malek, Senior Assistant Judge

Other Class Suit No. 61/2015 

Mr. Md. Nilchad (Plaintiff) Versus Md. Yakub (Defendant).

 

The suit’s trial gets ended and the argument is heard.

In the presence of...

 

And having stood for consideration to this day, the Court delivered the following judgment: This is a suit for declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to the landed property described in the schedule to the plaint through adverse possession.

The Plaint in the nutshell:

The landed property described in the schedule to the plaint has been in possession of the plaintiff from the lifetime of their predecessor over a period of 40 years by way of adverse possession of the suit lands. Actually, there was an oral exchange transactions between the fathers of the plaitifff and defendants. In that exchange, the defendants’ father took 16 decimal of lands comprising plot No. 150 of the SA khatian No. 52, and the plaintiff’s father took the suit lands. Nevertheless, RS record was wrongly prepared in the name of the defendants’ father Shahban. In fact, although the RS recorded tenant of the landed property described in the schedule to the plaint is one Shahban, the father of the defendants, they are completely out of the possession of the suit lands over 40 years. Even the predecessor of the plaintiffs attempted to take possession of the suit lands mentioning such RS record, but the plaintiffs' father drove them away from the suit lands.  But all of a sudden, the defendant made threats for dispossessing the plaintiffs from the suit lands on 10/05/2015, and hence, the plaintiff instituted the suit and invoked the court’s jurisdiction as prayed for.

The Written Statement in brief:

The Defendants contested the suit by filing a written statement denying the material averments made in the plaint. He contended therein, inter alia, that suit is the defect of parties, barred by limitation, and not maintainable in present form. Besides, the very suit’s facts are falsified that produce no cause of action and thus, is legally untenable, unjustifiable; and dismissible in law.

The SA recorded tenant of the landed property described in the schedule to the plaint is one Shahban Soardar and Shobhan Sardar. They were in possession of the suit lands on the basis of oral partitions. The RS record was prepared in the name of Shahban, the father of the plaintiffs, against 15 decimal of the suit lands comprised in the RS khatian No. 170. While in the exclusive possession of the suit lands, Shahban Sardar died leaving behind the plaintiffs, who were then placed in possession thereof. But after the plaintiff dispossessed them from the suit lands in the first half of the year of 2013, the defendants lodged an allegation with the concerned Union Parishod on 16/04/2013 but got no positive results from there. The plaintiff also made threats to them for not instituting any lawsuit in the regular court. Accordingly, the plaintiffs acquire no title to the suit lands. Hence, the suit is liable to be dismissed with costs.

Issues:

The pleadings of the parties are considered. As such, looking forward to determining the matters in controversy, the already framed issues are reframed under Rule 5 of Order 14 of the 1908 Code of Civil Procedure in the following way:


1.      Whether the suit is maintainable in the present form and manner.

2.     Whether the suit suffers from the defect of party. 

3.     Whether the plaintiffs have acquired title to the suit land.

4.     Whether the plaintiffs may get relief as prayed for.


Findings and Decisions

As proof of the claims, the plaintiff examined 04 witnesses and produced for the court's inspection documentary shreds of evidence which are marked as Exhibit No. 1. Defendants also examined 02 witnesses and produced documents marked as exhibit Nos. Ka-Gha. Heard the argument of the learned advocates appearing for both the parties.


Issue No. 2:

Pleading is a statement of claims. For every cause of action or relief, there must have a foundation in the pleadings. The purpose of Pleadings is to pinpoint the matters of controversy between the contending parties for enabling them to meet their respective claims. The relevant law in this respect is well-settled so far. On perusal of the suit record, it appears before the Court that in absence of anything contrary to it, the plaintiffs impleaded all heirs of the RS recorded tenant in the suit. In addition, except averments made in pleadings, no party to the suit raised any point as to the fact that the suit is bad for parties, and there is no materials on record that demonstrates the non-joinder of parties to the suit. Hence, this issue is decided in favor of the Plaintiffs.


Issue No. 3:  

It is admitted that the defendant is out of the possession of the suit lands and now, the plaintiff is in the possession of that landed property. Since the plaintiffs are claiming their rights by way of adverse possession, the burden of proof in respect to adverse possession is on them (for they claim that they have acquired title to the suit lands by way of adverse possession). As per Article 142 (and 144 respectively) of the 1908 Limitation Act, the plaintiff can only take a plea of adverse possession only if he has adversely to the defendant been in the physical possession of the property for the last 12 years and the defendant’s right under section 28 of the Limitation Act is extinguished. Since the plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law, there are some required elements for an adverse possession to be effective.

03. In a case of adverse possession of land, these aspects are to be taken into consideration: the plaintiffs’ possessor must have actually entered the property and must have exclusive possession of the property; the possession must be “open and notorious”; the possession must be adverse to the rightful owner and under a claim of right; and the possession must be “continuous” for the statutory period. More specifically, the plaintiffs claiming adverse possession must demonstrate (a) on what date, he came into possession; (b) what was the nature of his possession; (c) whether his possession was open, exclusive, continuous and undisturbed; (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) whether the factum of possession was known and hostile to the true owner.

04. On perusal of the materials available on record, it becomes trite to say that the plaintiffs appear to have claimed that they are in the exclusive possession of the suit lands over a period of 40 years. Interestingly, the defendants admitted [vide DW-01] in ways that currently, the plaintiffs are in possession of 15 decimal lands comprised in the RS plot No. 203. But they (plaintiffs) don't admit the plaintiff's possession in the suit lands before the year of 2013. As a result, on perusal of the shred of evidence adduced by the PW-01 and DW-01, it first becomes evident that the plaintiffs are now in “actual physical” possession and “not merely constructive” possession over the land.

05. Secondly, the plaintiffs further have proved that they have the requisite ingredient of animus possidendi (intention to possess) while claiming ownership by taking the plea of adverse possession. Hostile Possession is a kind of possession that is without the consent of the owner and the assertion of which conflicts with the property ownership interests of the owner. Moreover, since animus possidendi is necessary, possession does not become adverse when the intention to hold adversely is wanting. In our case, the materials on record vividly suggest that the plaintiffs holding the suit property by way of adverse possession must have published his intention to deny the right of the real owner, and such an intention of adverse possession is within the notice, knowledge of the defendant. Hence, it is also established with a credible piece of evidence that the plaintiff’s possession is “open, known and hostile” to the actual owner (defendants).

06. Now, consider whether his possession was exclusive, undisturbed, and "continuous" for the statutory period. In this respect, oral testimony could be instrumental to make a decision thereon. The PW-01 stated that the landed property described in the schedule to the plaint has been in possession of the plaintiff from the lifetime of their predecessor over a period of 40 years by way of adverse possession of the suit lands. In the inception, there was an oral exchange transaction between the fathers of the plaintiffs and defendants. By way of that exchange, the defendants' father took 16 decimal of lands comprising plot No. 150 of the SA khatian No. 52, and the plaintiff’s father took the suit lands. Subsequently, the RS record was wrongly prepared in the name of the defendants’ father Shahban. The plaintiffs thus claims that although the RS recorded tenant of the landed property described in the schedule to the plaint is the father of the defendants, Shahban, they (defendants) are completely out of the possession of the suit lands for over 40 years.

07. In evidence, the plaintiff-side depends on the premise that the suit landed property has been in possession of the plaintiff from the lifetime of their predecessor by way of adverse possession of the suit lands; and that period already becomes over a period of 40 years. Apparently, although the plaintiffs mention no starting point of adverse possession, they admitted [PW-01] that the defendants made threats to them for dispossession from the suit lands on 10.05.2015. So, the statutory period could be reckoned reversely from the ending point of the plaintiffs’ alleged peaceful and continuous possession.

08. The PW-01 further claims in his evidence that he has himself been cultivating the suit lands, by establishing betel fields the last five years. He also added that his father cultivated paddy on the suit lands too. But the PW-03 stated that one “Jamal” establishes the betel field upon agreement. The other two witnesses [PW-02 and 03] only certify that there is a betel field on the suit lands and the plaintiffs are in possession of it. So, it is noticeable that none supported the plaintiffs (PW-01) on the fact of their predecessor’s paddy cultivation over a certain period. What becomes vivid is that PW-01 and PW-03 added a fact of betel field, which has been installed just five or six years ago. Interestingly, PW-03 deposed as such in September of 2019 and at best six-year back goes in 2013. The defendants in their pleading conspicuously stated that the plaintiffs made them out of possession in the first half of 2013. Even, the DW-02 added that the plaintiffs along with “Jamal” had dispossessed the defendants 6/7 years ago. Accordingly, there arises a material point that goes antithesis to the plaintiffs’ proposition.

09. Moreover, both PW-03 and DW-02 stated that one “Jamal” establishes the betel field upon agreement. Both are the most competent witnesses as they have lands adjacent to the suit lands. As aforesaid, the DW-02 added that the plaintiffs along with “Jamal” had dispossessed the defendants 6/7 years ago. The fact is that Mr. “Jamal” currently cultivating the suit lands is “not examined” before the court. Although the plaintiffs’ witness PW-03 made an addendum of Jamal’s episode, non-examination of Mr. Jamal before the court becomes mischievous to the plaintiffs under section 103 of the 1872 Evidence Act (the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence). So, it is deducible that the plaintiffs have not been able to discharge such an onus legally cast on him.

10. Even, if the plaintiff’s evidence in this regard is considered as it were, the plaintiffs' positions become unsupportive with another witness like the PW-03. Plus, the non-examination of Mr. Jamal procreates adverse presumption against the plaintiffs under section 114 (G) of the 1872 Evidence Act. For that reason, there arises another fact that also goes antithetical to the plaintiffs’ discourse of evidence. That being such, it is decisive that the evidence of the plaintiff coterie carries them nowhere in the proof of their claim of exclusive, continuous, and undisturbed possession for over the statutory period. The legal position counsels that the possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in the extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, and hostile and continued over the statutory period, which is 12 years from the date of alleged dispossession [vide Art. 142 of the 1908 Limitation Act]. Hence, the whole fabric of the materials on record persuades the court to opine that the plaintiffs should suffer from such an annihilating position.

11. Furthermore, on careful consideration of the materials on record, it also transpires that in the case of declaration of title based on adverse possession, material consideration is the question of adverse possession is to be determined on the basis of the specific averment made in the plaint. In our case, the plaintiffs' pleading enumerates that an oral exchange was executed between the fathers of both plaintiffs and defendants. In that exchange transaction, the defendants' father took 16 decimal of lands comprising plot No. 150 of the SA khatian No. 52, and the plaintiff’s father took the suit lands. In cross-examination, the PW01 stated that Saibot, Kamal, and Ashraf know about that exchange. Saibot deposed as PW-02 who testified that he was yet to be borne at the time of exchange. PW-03 & PW-04 having lands just adjacent to the suit lands are found totally silent about the plaintiffs’ specific fact- “oral exchange”. So, the PW-01 remains unsupported by other witnesses adduced by him. In addition, since RS record was prepared in the name of the defendant's predecessor one Shahban, not in the name of the plaintiff’s predecessor. Consequently, the plaintiffs are precluded from claiming the presumptive value of the latest Record of Rights.

12. Interestingly, the DW-01 convincingly states in his cross-examination a basis of his dispossession from the suit lands, that is to say, the suit lands situate on the western side adjacent to the other lands of the plaintiffs. As such, it appears that the so-called basis of adverse possession on the specific averment made in the plaint has not been proved with credible and weighty evidence. Additionally, there comes in the pertinence of the dicta observed by the Privy Council [vide 28 AIR 1934 PC 23] that “the ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be “nec vi nec clam, nec precario” (without force, without secrecy, without permission). Pertinently, the use of “force” to dispossess a true owner seemingly affects the fine-terrain of the court’s discretionary and equitable relief.  Pertinently, another cardinal principle also resounds here that although the plea of adverse possession can be used both as a sword and as a shield, a person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favor, simply because, he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner [vide 2015 (5) ALT 634]. Thus, it is for the plaintiff to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary for adverse possession.

13. However, it also appears that the defendants did not take the plea that the plaintiffs are now in possession, by way of permissive possession, or as the co-owner of the land claiming ownership by way of adverse possession, or, as part performance in according to an agreement to sell as provided under Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act, 1882. So, any discussion about these points fairly stands outside the ambit of the present context.

14. In fact, the court understands that adverse possession is also known as squatter’s rights. Basically, the term ‘adverse possession’ is not defined anywhere in the Limitation Act, as it is not a positive right and merely a negative and consequential right, which is based on the negligence or inaction on the part of the rightful owner of the land to come forward and take legal recourse in case any person is in hostile possession of his land. The relevant law is that only having long continuous possession is not enough to perfect title by adverse possession and all other ingredients, that are hostile, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession for 12 years, are also necessary. So, since the plaintiffs are trying to defeat the rights of true owner (defendants), it is for them to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. But here, the court is of the view that the plaintiffs are not found to be able to prove and establish their adverse possession of the suit lands.

15.  No doubt, this suit is for declaration of title to the suit land on the basis of adverse possession. In short, title is a legal term that refers to an interest and ownership of something. In jurisprudential sense, title to property thus refers to ownership of the property, meaning that you have the rights to use that property. On the other hands, ownership to lands refers to an aggregate of all the rights a person has with those lands that he owns. Particularly, the concept of ownership flows from that of possession [vide A Textbook of Jurisprudence, G. W. Paton, (1973) OUP, p. 539, 546]. Accordingly, it can be said that when you have ownership, then you have only ownership; and when you have title, then you have ownership as well as title. Here is the germane fact is that unless the enjoyment of the property is accompanied by adverse animus for a statutory period, mere possession would not be sufficient to mature the title to the property by adverse possession. Therefore, it is the courts’ view that although the plaintiff’s current possession over the suit lands in entirety has been proved with credible and weighty evidence; they are in legal parlance not adjudged to be entitled to the suit lands by way of adverse possession.

In dispelling ambiguity, it is also pertinent to mention that it is not necessary to enter upon a detail discussion of the question of onus. The reason is simple: the whole fabric of the evidential edifice is before the court; which finds no difficulty in arriving at a conclusion with regard to the issues in discussion. So, in considering the aforesaid facts, relevant laws, and corroborative evidence as well as encompassing conditions, it appears to the court that the plaintiff’s title through adverse possession to the suit lands is not proved and established with unimpeachable evidence. Hence, this issue is not settled in the plaintiff’s favor.


Issue No. 1 and 4:

For brevity, convenience and correlation, all the issues are taken together in discussing the matter in the suit. These issues are certainly crucial in point of laws and facts for being related to the questions of the maintainability and eligibility for getting relief sought for in the Plaint. On perusal of the suit materials, the court is of opinion that this is a competent court to grant relief as prayed for in this suit. But, as aforesaid, since it appears to the Court that the plaintiffs have not been able to prove on their own strength with credible pieces of evidence that the plaintiffs have acquired title to the suit land by way of adverse possession, the court finds adequate reasons to hold that the instant suit is not maintainable in its present form and manner. Furthermore, as such, because of all of the issues discussed above, it is thus held that since the plaintiffs have not been successful in proving all issues in their favor, the plaintiffs are not adjudged to be entitled to get relief as prayed for. And thus, it is decided that the suit deserves to be dismissed on contest.


Court fee paid is sufficient.

Hence,

it is ORDERED that

the suit be dismissed on contest against the defendants without any order as to costs.

            (Composed and corrected by me)

continue reading Judgement passed in the other class No. 61/2015 (Declaration of Title)

Judgement passed in the Family Suit No. 60/19 (dower money and maintenance)

HEADING OF JUDGEMENT IN ORIGINAL SUIT/CASE

District: Rajshahi                        

In the Court of Family Judge, Mohonpur, Rajshahi

Present: - Mr. Md. Abdul Malek, Judge, Family Court

Family Suit No. 60/19

Mst. Joli Begum, Plaintiff Versus Mr. Md. Hafijul Rahman, Defendant

The suit coming on trial ended and the argument was heard.

In the presence of...

And having stood for consideration to this day, the Court delivered the following judgment: This is a family suit instituted with a prayer for recovering unpaid dower money and maintenance against the Defendant.

 

The Plaintiffs’ Plaint in the nutshell:

A marriage was contracted and registered between the Plaintiff and the Defendant on 20/07/2019 upon fixing dower money at Tk. 3,00,000/. In the aftermath, the Defendant demanded dowry; and on refusal to give him dowry, he drove the Plaintiff away from his adobe on 01/08/2019 and then, she took shelter in her father’s house. From that time, the Plaintiff started staying at that abode and later on, she repudiated their marital tie on 04/08/2019. On 01/08/2019, the Plaintiff demanded unpaid dower money and her maintenance from the Defendant but the latter refused to pay the same; and hence the suit.

 

The Written Statement in Brief:

On the other hand, the Defendant contested the suit by filing written statement denying the material averments made in the plaint. He contended, inter alia, that the Plaintiff lacks in locus standi, the impugned facts are fabricated and fraudulent, and the very suit is legally untenable, unjustifiable; and dismissible for cloudy cause of actions.

The Defendant stated that the plaintiff is a spouse of his step brother, who got married to each other ten years ago and now, they have two offspring in their family. The defendant also claimed that there is or was no marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant; and they never reside under same roof upon marital knot. Since there was no marriage either through sharia law or registered nikahnama, there arises no question as to the dissolution by the plaintiff of that alleged marriage in between. Hence, the plaintiff is not entitled to get any reliefs as prayed for and the suit is liable to be dismissed.

 

Issues:

Considering the parties’ pleadings, the issues are framed with modifications for discussion in the following way:

1.     Whether the suit is maintainable in the present form and manner.

2.    Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get her dower money.

3.    Whether the plaintiff is entitled to iddat maintenance.

4.    Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get remedy as prayed for.

 

Discussions and Decisions

In proof of the claims, the Plaintiff examined herself as PW. 01, and other witnesses as PW 02-06, and produced documentary evidences marked as Exhibit No. 01-05. On the other side, the Defendant examined himself as DW 01 and another witness as DW-02. Another witness as CW-01 is also examined before the court. After the trial of the suit ended, the last reconciliation effort was failed and then, heard arguments from both sides.  

Issue No. 01:

The plaintiff filed the suit before this family court having jurisdiction under the provisions of the Family Court Ordinance, 1985; and paid proper court fees, with a prayer for a decree for dower and maintenance. Section 05 of the Family Court Ordinance, 1985 recognizes any aggrieved person’s right to file a lawsuit concerning the matter of dower and maintenance. So, since there appear no contrary materials to the aforesaid premise, it is decided that the suit is maintainable in the current form and manner. Hence, in the absence of materials to the contrary, the issue is settled in the plaintiff’s favor.

Issue No. 02 and 03:

On perusal of the materials available on record, it appears that it is admitted that marriage was contracted and registered between the plaintiff Joly Begum and her current husband, one Selim Reza (PW-05) and now the plaintiff is leading conjugal life with him (Selim Reza) with having two offspring in their family [vide PW-01, (cross-examination). Accordingly, it is conspicuous that there existed and now exists a spousal relationship between the plaintiff and Selim Reza to date. Consequently, as issue No. 02 suggests, there arises a pertinent question as to whether the plaintiff got legally married to the defendant meanwhile so that she should get dower money from the defendant.


04. In the search of an answer to the aforesaid question, it appears that the plaintiff claims in her pleading and evidence that her marriage with Selim Reza (allegedly 1st husband) was dissolved through a khua talaq on 20/04/19 (ext: 06) and then, following the event, she further married to the defendant Hafizul Rahman (allegedly 2nd husband) on 20/07/2019 upon fixing dower money at Tk. 3,00,000 [PW-01; ext: 01]. Having claimed as such, the plaintiff tried to establish a case on the point that she meanwhile got married to the defendant and thus, is entitled to dower money and maintenance. On the other hand, the defendant is found in total disagreement with the plaintiff in ways that the plaintiff is a spouse of his stepbrother, who got married to each other ten years ago and now, they are leading their marital life with having two offspring in their family. The defendant also claimed that there is or was no marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant, and they never reside under the same roof upon marital knot (vide DW-01). Likewise, the defendant claims that since there was no marriage either through sharia law or registered Nikahnama, there arises no question as to the dissolution by the plaintiff of that alleged marriage in between (DW. 01-02). Hence, the defendant claims on those premises that the plaintiff is not entitled to get any reliefs as prayed for.


05. Now, considering aforesaid propositions as such, another incidental question comes into play on the fact that whether the marital relationship between the plaintiff and Selim Reza meanwhile lawfully terminated or not. That is to say, was there any lawful marriage between them (plaintiff and defendant)? On perusal of the materials on record, it transpires in evidence that Selim Reza got examined as PW-05 who vividly deposed that the plaintiff is his spouse and spent 7/8 years together as a spouse, and now, they have two offspring in their family. He also asserted that he repudiated his marital tie with the plaintiff after the birth of their 2nd child through khula talaq in 2019. On the issue at hand, he unequivocally asserted that he did not serve notice of talaq to the concerned U.P. chairman. Even, the plaintiff did not place any evidence on the fact that the notice of khula talaq was served upon the concerned U.P. chairman.


06. However, on this very vital point, the plaintiff only put forward the certified copy of the registration of khula talaq (ext: 06), and thus, claims that the talaq in question becomes effective as such.  On the other hand, the defendant underscored his position on the demand that a spousal relationship between the plaintiff and Selim Reza exists to date since its inception. Accordingly, it becomes incumbent to consider the pertinent provisions of law that touch the ensuing facts. Section 7 of the 1961Muslim Family Laws Ordinance stipulates that “Any man who wishes to divorce his wife shall, as soon as may be after the pronouncement of talaq in any form whatsoever, give the Chairman notice in writing of his having done so, and shall supply a copy thereof to the wife. It also envisages that “Save, as provided in sub-section (5,), a talaq unless revoked earlier, expressly or otherwise, shall not be effective until the expiration of ninety days from the day on which notice under sub-section (1) is delivered to the Chairman.


07. The plain reading of the above statutory provision gives us a lucid understanding that any pronouncement of talaq shall not be effective until the expiration of ninety days from the day on which notice under sub-section (1) is delivered to the Chairman. The words “in any form whatsoever” appearing in section 7(1) of the Ordinance 1961 is very much significant; as it spells out that “in any form" means and includes khula talaq too; no matter whether talaq is registered or not), or no matter whether any modes of Talaq stated in Mahomedan Law. Because section 7 requires only a notice of a talaq to be given to the Chairman to give effect to divorce. In fact, Khula or Mubara'at is another form of talaq or dissolution of marriage by agreement Khula or Mubarat is stated in section 319 of Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan Law [19th Ed. 1990, (2010 reprint)].


08. Now, consider a bird's eye view on some judicial pronouncements on section 7 of The Ordinance of 1961. With regard to the objects, requirements, and consequences of section 7 of the 1961Ordinance, it has been highlighted that the object of section 7 of The Ordinance is to prevent the hasty dissolution of marriage by talaq proposed by the husband, unilaterally, without an attempt is being made to prevent disruption of matrimonial status [vide 15 DLR (SC) 9]. It has also been laid down that in the event of failure of compliance of provision of sub-section 1 of section 7 of The Ordinance a Talaq even if pronounced by a husband cannot be effective in law and the marriage between husband and wife subsists [vide Abdul Aziz vs Rezia Khatoon 21 DLR 733].


09. It has further been reported [46 DLR 700] that divorce under the Ordinance is not a unilateral act, and it precludes a divorce on talaq from being effective from a period of ninety days from the date of receipt of the notice by the Chairman and consequently marital status of the parties will not in any way change and parties in law will continue to remain, husband and wife, till the divorce is confirmed. Ninety days reconciliation period is to start from the date of receipt of notice by the Chairman, and not from the date when it was written. Although the failure of the Chairman to constitute an arbitration council or that of a duly constituted arbitration council to take necessary steps to bring about reconciliation is inconsequential, it is the legal position that there shall be not Talak in the eye of law unless provision contained in section 7(1) is sternly complied with; and marriage between husband and wife shall subsist. In the event of subsistence of the existing marriage, no man or woman can enter into a second marriage. And if he enters, he shall contribute himself to be punished under section 6(5) of the Ordinance. [vide Dilruba Aktar vs AHM Mohsin, 55 DLR 568].

 

10. Non-service of notice to the Chairman of the Union Parishad under the provision of this section cannot render ineffective divorce disclosed in an affidavit. [vide Sirajul Islam vs Helana Begum and others, 48 DLR 48]. The whole materials on record reveal that the Khula talaq in question was not disclosed in an affidavit. It was also aptly argued in an occasion reported in Md Sirajul Islam vs Mosammat Helena Begum, [1996 BLD 477] that “when divorce is clearly established by the conduct of the husband, mere non-service of notice upon the Chairman as enjoined by section 7 of the Ordinance does not render the divorce ineffective.” In this respect, it can be opined that with respect to the Khula talaq in question, a duty was cast upon the husband to give notice under section 7 of the said Ordinance. Here, the current husband of the plaintiff, Selim Reza, admitted in evidence (PW-05) that he did not discharge his duty to serve notice to the concerned U.P. chairman. Moreover, because Selim Reza is still leading his conjugal life with the plaintiff, his Khula talaq attempt was presumably not intended by him, not for eternity. Even, the non-service of notice to the chairman provided no change of reconciliation whatsoever.  Accordingly, it vividly transpires to the court that the conduct of the plaintiff and Selim Reza carries them nowhere in dissolving their marital tie.

 

11. Talaq pronounced by the wife must be communicated to the husband. In our case, it was the alleged khula talaq. A divorce by Khula is a divorce with consent. So, it is assumable that although the communication of consents was over and complete, the defendant was not that communicated husband; instead, her current husband was communicated as such (as admittedly, the defendant and the plaintiff’s current husband is not identical person). Hence, there arises no question as to effective communication between the plaintiff and defendant. In addition, the defendant does not admit the fact of any divorce between the plaintiff and her spouse Selim Reza. Accordingly, the conduct of the parties has no pertinence in deciding, whether the requirement of section 7(1) of the 1961 Ordinance was constructively compiled or not, or whether the intendment of the legislature is served. The literal or popular interpretation suggests that if the language of a statute is plain, the only duty of the court is to give effect to it, and the court has no business to look into the consequences of such interpretation.

 

12. Therefore, it becomes clear that “no notice” under section 7(1) means “no talaq”....unless the provisions of section 7(1) of the 1961 Muslim Family Laws Ordinance are complied with regarding service of notice to the Chairman of Union Council. In essence, such a talaq attempt would fail to operate. Therefore, it is the court’s view that the alleged talaq between the plaintiff and her current spouse Selim Reza could not free her (plaintiff) to marry (the defendant) ‘meanwhile’. The provision of section 7(1) of the Ordinance was standing on their way [vide 15 DLR (SC) 9] To demystify, one may again come up with a question whether the deed of divorce (ext. 06), even if held to be genuine, would operate as a valid divorce under the current statutory provisions. The answer to this question, so as to the fact of the suit is pertinent, is resounding “no”; it would not operate as a valid divorce under the current statutory provisions of section 7(1) of the 1961 Muslim Family Laws Ordinance. The boom line counsels that section 7(1) must sternly be complied with in order to give legal effect to an intended divorce. Hence, upon the aforesaid premise, it is the court’s view that in the subsistence of marital tie between the plaintiff and Selim Reza, the plaintiff’s claim that marriage was contracted and registered between the Plaintiff and the Defendant on 20/07/2019 upon fixing dower money at Tk. 3,00,000 is not sustainable in law.

 

13. Furthermore, as aforesaid, the defendant does not admit the marriage contract and denies the authenticity of the marriage registration (the plaintiff’s alleged second marriage). Although the certified copy of the Nikahnama is placed before that court, and later on divorce papers (ext: 1-5), a close perusal of the materials available on record, it speaks out that the fact of the plaintiff’s second marriage with the defendant appears to be incongruent and unconvincing. The PW-01 once stated in her cross-examination that her second marriage was done at the house of Altaf Kazi. She again stated at the office of Altaf Kazi. Altaf Kazi was not examined before the court; instead, Md. Shohrab Hosen as CW-01 deposed that Altaf was his assistant, and Altaf as a witness to the marriage and Altaf as Kazi are not the same person. Besides, PWs 01-02 stated that the marriage in question was contracted in the afternoon and in the presence of the plaintiff’s father, but PW-04 underscored that it was done at 8 PM (at night), and he omitted to mention the presence of her father at that occasion. In addition, the DW-01 denies his signatures on both Nikahnama and the acknowledgment of talaq notice. No expert evidence is led by either party too. However, the DW02 also asserted the fact of his ignorance of any marriage between the plaintiff and defendant, although he claims to be one of their close relatives.

 

Taking into consideration of the aforesaid facts, relevant laws, and ensuing circumstances, it is the court’s view that the whole fabric of the legal and evidentiary edifice cannot make the plaintiff stand on her own strength in proving her claims as such. So, the court is decisive on the point that the alleged talaq between the plaintiff and her husband Selim Reza was not effective, and thus, there was no valid marriage, allegedly contracted on 20/07/2019, between the Plaintiff and the Defendant upon fixing the aforesaid dower money. The relevant law is enunciated in section 256 of Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan Law [19th Ed. 1990, (2010 reprint)] that “no Mohamedan woman cannot have more than one husband at the same time.” Accordingly, the claims of the plaintiff are not sufficiently proved with convincing and unimpeachable evidence and thus, not sustainable in law. As a result, where there is no valid marriage, there is no question of dower or talaq between the plaintiff and defendant on board. Hence, the issues Nos. 02 and 03 are not decided in the plaintiff’s favor.

 

Issue No. 04:

In essence, since the issues Nos. 02 and 03 are not decided in the plaintiff’s favor, it is, therefore, held that the plaintiff is not entitled to get the relief as prayed for. Accordingly, in the light of the discussions and decisions and the consideration of pleadings, facts, surrounding circumstances, evidence both oral and documentary on record as well as relevant laws, the court is of view that the suit deserves to be dismissed on the contest.

 

The court fee paid is sufficient.

Hence, it is ordered that the suit be dismissed on contest against the Defendant without any order as to costs.

 

continue reading Judgement passed in the Family Suit No. 60/19 (dower money and maintenance)

25 June 2022

Judgment passed in the other class suit No. 62/2018

HEADING OF JUDGEMENT IN ORIGINAL SUIT/CASE

District: Rajshahi

In the Court of the Senior Assistant Judge, Mohonpur, Rajshahi

Present: - Md. Abdul Malek, Senior Assistant Judge

Other Class Suit No. 62/2018

Mst. Hameda Bibi (Plaintiff) Versus Mr. Riaz Uddin (Defendant).

 

The suit's trial ended and the argument was heard.

In the presence of................................

 

And having stood for consideration to this day, the Court delivered the following judgment: This is a suit for a permanent injunction regarding the landed property described in the schedule to the plaint.

The Plaint in the nutshell:

The recorded tenant of the suit lands described as RS khatian No. 223 in the schedules to the plaint was one Nurjahan Beowa, who is the predecessor mother of the plaintiffs. After the demise of Nurjahan Beowa, the plaintiffs as his heirs got title to and possession in the suit landed property. The plaintiffs claim that they are now in exclusive possession of the suit land. Despite having no title to the suit land, the defendants made threats to the plaintiffs for dispossession from the suit lands, and hence the suit. The Plaintiffs claimed that the suit land belongs to them; and that is now under their possession. Hence, he is entitled to get relief as prayed for. 

The Written Statements in Brief:

The defendant No. 1 & 4-5 contested the suit by filing written statements denying the material averments made in the plaint. They contended therein, inter alia, that the suit not maintainable in the present form, has no cause of action and thus, is legally untenable, unjustifiable; and dismissible in law. Defendants stated that the recorded tenant of the suit lands described as RS khatian No. 223 in the schedules to the plaint was one Nurjahan Beowa, who transferred 0.84 acres of lands to her daughter Mrs. Jobeda Beowa via a registered deed of gift No. 5419/1999. Recorded tenant Nurjahan also transferred 0.10 acres of land to her daughter Jobeda Beowa via a registered deed No. 2842/2000. Then, Jobeda Beowa transferred 0.93 acres of land to defendant No. 01 Mr. Riaz Uddin via a registered deed No. 1707/2003. Some lawsuits were also brought into being regarding the suit lands and respective deeds; but, final courts’ decisions do not support the plaintiffs’ title to the suit lands.

Defendant No. 01 also transferred some lands to Defendant Nos. 4-5. Accordingly, the lands were mutated against the defendant’s name and land rents are being paid by him accordingly. In fact, the plaintiffs have no title as well as no exclusive possession of the suit land in its entirety. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have no cause of action and any rights to sue regarding the land in question and thus, the plaintiff's suit is not sustainable in the law. Hence, the suit will be dismissed.

Issues

In cognizance of the parties’ pleadings and the matters in controversy, the issues are reframed under Or. 14, R. 05 of the 1908 Code of Civil Procedure in the following way:

1.      Whether the suit is maintainable in the present form and manner.

2.      Whether the plaintiffs have prima facie title to the suit land.

3.      Whether the plaintiffs have exclusive possession of the suit land.

4.      Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief as prayed for?


Discussions and Decisions:

During the trial, the plaintiff examined 04 witnesses and produced documentary pieces of evidence marked as exhibits No. 1-3. Defendants examined 03 witnesses and produced documents marked as Exhibit No. Ka-Dha Arguments were heard from both parties after the conclusion of the trial of the suit.

Issue No. 02:

These issues are taken together for concision, convenience, and interrelation. No skepticism, it becomes high time to see through the plaintiffs’ prima facie title to the suit land envisaged in the Kha schedule. In proof of their prima facie title thereto, the plaintiffs narrated in ways that the recorded tenant of the suit lands described as RS khatian No. 223 [ext.: 01-02] in the schedules to the plaint was one Nurjahan Beowa, who is the predecessor mother of the plaintiffs. After the demise of Nurjahan Beowa, the plaintiffs as his heirs got title to and possession in the suit landed property.

06. On the contrary, the defendant No. 1 & 4-5 contended that the recorded tenant of the suit lands described as RS khatian No. 223 in the schedules to the plaint was one Nurjahan Beowa, who transferred 0.84 acres of lands to her daughter Mrs. Jobeda Beowa via a registered deed of gift No. 5419/1999[ext.: Cha]. Recorded tenant Nurjahan also transferred 0.10 acres of land to her daughter Jobeda Beowa via a registered deed No. 2842/2000. Then, Jobeda Beowa transferred 0.93 acres of land to defendant No. 01 Mr. Riaz Uddin via a registered deed No. 1707/2003[ext.: Chha]. It is also stated that defendant No. 01 also transferred some lands to Defendant Nos. 4-5 [ext.: Ja-Jha]. Accordingly, the lands were mutated against the defendant’s name and land rents are being paid by him as such [ext.: Tha-Da]. On perusal of the Exhibit Ka-Kha, it also appears that the defendants’ title to the suit lands in part has been established through the court’s verdicts. In giving testimony, the DW-01 evidently claims that they are entitled to 93 decimal lands out of the suit property.

07. Now, consider the scheduled property: RS khatian No. 223 [ext.: 01-02] scheduled to the plaint. The measurement of land comprised in this khatian is of 1.60 acres. It is now well settled that ‘in a suit for permanent injunction, the court need not enter into disputed title except to the extent that it would help the court in finding which of the parties have prima facei title and exclusive possession’ (vide 56 DLR Ad 22). In essence, ‘title’ is a legal term that refers to interest and ownership of something. In a jurisprudential sense, title to the property also refers to ‘ownership of the property", meaning that you have ‘the rights to use’ that property. Particularly, the concept of ownership flows from that of ‘possession’[vide A Textbook of Jurisprudence, G. W. Paton, (1973) OUP, p. 539, 546]. So, it is apparent that an investigation into the parties’ entitlement to the suit lands is clearly a matter of deep analysis and intense examination, which is fairly beyond the simpliciter suit’s preview. However, it could cogently be opined that there arises some good standing that demonstrates the plaintiffs’ prima facie title to the suit land, and thus, it is decided that the plaintiffs have successfully established their prima facie title to the suit landed property. Hence, it is decided that this issue is decided in the plaintiff’s favor.

 

Issue No. 03:

In pleading and evidence, the plaintiffs claim that they are now in exclusive possession of the suit land, and the PW-01 has deposed that they have eight old mango trees, 16 new mango trees, and a house built by the mother of plaintiff No. 01. The PW-01 claims that all plaintiffs are in exclusive possession in lands measuring 1.60 acres. It is the plaintiff’s case that despite having no title to the suit land, the defendants made threats to the plaintiffs for dispossession from the suit lands. The Plaintiffs thus claimed that since the suit land belongs to them and is now under their possession, they are entitled to get relief as prayed for. 

09. Now consider the adduced evidence in this respect. The PW-02 also stated that only plaintiff No. 01 Hameda is in possession of the suit. But the PW-03 stated in his examination-in-chief that only plaintiff Hamida is in possession; but in his cross-examination, he again said that plaintiff Hamida and Plaintiff Jobeda possess the lands in question. Both PWs 02-03 are found to be contradictory to each other, although they claim themselves to be adjacent to the suit lands. Furthermore, the PW-04 claims himself to be a cultivator on the suit lands, but he was unable to specify how much of lands he cultivates on behalf of plaintiff Hamida. More particularly, the PW-01 stated in his cross-examination that one Fozlu and Khorshed worked for them on the suit lands at the time of paddy harvest, but these two persons are not examined before the court. Consequently, in considering the discussion made hereinbefore, it also occurs that such contradictory assertions by the plaintiff’s witnesses fade away from their credibility, and thus, they are not found in harmony with the same sense and manner. Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot claim any support from them.

10. On the contrary, to substantiate the defendants’ possession, the DW-01 also asserted a similar proposition in evidence, even in addition to fact that defendant No. 01 and defendant No. 4-7 have also possession in the lands measuring 95 decimal out of the suit property. In cross-examination, the PW-01 also attempted to underscore the fact of his possession as such. The DW-02 also stated that he purchased 02 decimal lands, comprised in RS Plot No. 1953, from defendant No. 01 and now, has been in possession of that land. The DW-03 is also found to be walking in the shoe of the DW02. These witnesses are examined in cross-examination but nothing contradictory was unearthed by the plaintiff's side.

11. However, apart from oral testimony regarding de facto possessory evidence, there is also documentary evidence that talks about de jure possession of the parties. In cross-examination, the PW-01 admitted that he paid land tax in 2015 for 67 decimal lands, but he claims their possession in lands measuring 1.60 acres. She (PW-01) also asserted that they have also paid taxes but did not provide the same to the court for inspection. On the other hand, the defendant's side places some tax receipt and prostabito khatian looking forward to proving de jure possession of the suit lands [ext.: Tha-Da]. No doubt, the record of rights is evidence of present possession, meaning a record of physical possession at the time when it is prepared (vide 59 DLR 207; 07 ADC 945). In this way, it is cogent to opine that such a mutation also gives rise to a presumption that the defendants are also in possession of the suit land.  And the fact thus follows that the plaintiffs have not been able to rebut such a presumption.

12. Moreover, the plaintiff-side also underscores an order passed by the court of Addl. District Magistrate (Rajshahi) under section 144 (but the content of the case suggests it would be under section 145) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But the defendant side made robust objections to the admissibility of a criminal court’s judgment in a civil proceeding. In rejoinder, the plaintiff-side pleaded that the court of Addl. District Magistrate exercising jurisdictions under section 144 or 145 is a quasi-civil court. In fact, the general legal position is that “a criminal court’s finding of possession is not admissible in evidence in a civil suit” [vide 40 DLR 1988 271]. And the issue of inter-admissibility of judgments arising from different proceedings is governed by the 1872 Evidence Act. As per section 43 of the Act, judgment, order or decree are irrelevant other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41, and 42, unless the existence of such judgment, order, or decree is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provision of this Act. A test is whether the concept of res judicata would result as an outcome of the given proceeding, largely based upon the same premises. The dichotomy of legal systems indicates that an order of the aforesaid court exercising jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure may not result in a decree (if the case is successful) or operate as res judicata for a proceeding under the Code of Civil Procedure, this court is not prone to swim with the tide led by the plaintiff-side.  

13. Apart from the fact that the defendant-side places some latest documentary pieces of evidence, including prostabito khatian and tax receipts in proof of their possession in the suit land, as well as convincing oral testimony regarding their current possession, the defendant's side also placed some registered deeds in favor of their claims that they have good property deeds and documentation concerning the suit lands. On perusal of the documentary evidence marked exhibit stated above, it vividly transpires to the court that the defendant side produced more convincing and dependable materials than the plaintiff side. Therefore, the court holds that the pieces of evidence concerning the plaintiffs' possession in the suit lands lack practical certainty and reasonable propriety. In addition, it conspicuously admitted that the suit lands are admitted not yet to be allotted among the sharers by meets and bounds on partition [vide PW-01]. Hence, it is decided that the balance of preponderance towards the suit lands ‘possession goes against the plaintiffs so far.

14. In dispelling ambiguity, it is also pertinent to mention that it is not necessary to enter into a detailed discussion of the question of onus. The reason is simple: the whole fabric of the evidential edifice is before the court; which finds no difficulty in arriving at a conclusion about the issues in discussion. So, in considering the aforesaid facts, relevant laws, and corroborative evidence as well as encompassing conditions, it appears to the court that although the plaintiffs have been successful in establishing their prima facie title to the suit lands, they have failed to prove their exclusive possession therein. So, the issue at hand is not settled in favor of the plaintiffs.


Issues No. 01 & 04:

The essence of the suit's alleged cause of action displayed in the plaint reveals that the defendants made threats to the plaintiff for dispossessing the latter from the suit lands and thus, had caused interruption to the plaintiffs' exclusive possession of the suit property. There is thus no gainsaying that this is a suit for a permanent injunction. On perusal of the materials on record, it vividly appears that the plaintiff filed the suit before this court having jurisdiction with paying proper court fees and seeking a decree for perpetual injunction simpliciter. Section 54 of the 1877 Specific Relief Act recognizes any aggrieved person's right to file a lawsuit for such a relief as prayed for.

16. However, in the light of the discussion made hereinbefore, it becomes lucid that the plaintiffs have not been able to prove their exclusive possession in the specified lands scheduled to the plaint; instead, the defendants’ possession is also proven to be in the suit lands. In a suit for permanent injunction, the plaintiffs shall have to prove their exclusive possession of the suit land in order to get a decree [vide 7 BLC HCD 2002]. In our case, the plaintiffs have failed to prove their exclusive possession out of a vast plot, and that cannot be ascertained unless the suit lands are sufficiently specified and ascertained. Since the plaintiff has failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of law, they are not entitled to any decree even if they have some merits in the suit. Yet, this is not a suit for partition, where all sorts of legal questions regarding the suit lands could be resolved.

17. The general principle of evidence law is that “the burden lies on the Plaintiff to prove his case and he must succeed on his own strength only and not at the weakness of the adversary” [vide 3 BLC 6], and the weakness of the defence case does not entitle the plaintiff to get a decree [vide 06 BLC AD 2001]. It would also be verbose to reiterate that in a simple suit for permanent injunction with regard to a disputed landed property, relief is not available to a person who is not in possession’ (vide 43 DLR AD 215). Pertinently, an injunction cannot be granted in a case where the defendant has legal character as to title and possession in the suit property.

Therefore, in respect of the instant suit, the cumulative effect and cogency of legal inference help the court hold that since the plaintiffs have failed to entirely prove their exclusive possession in the suit lands, the plaintiffs have not sufficiently been able to prove their exclusive possession in the entire suit lands and a complicated question of title and possession is involved in the suit. It is decisive to the court that the suit is maintainable in its current form and manner. Accordingly, the Court is of the view that since all of these issues are not decided in the plaintiff’s favor, the instant suit is not a good fit for exercising the Court’s discretion in decreeing the same. As such, the Plaintiffs may not get relief as prayed for. As a result, the suit deserves to be dismissed on contest.

The court fee paid is sufficient.

Hence,

it is  ORDERED

that the suit be dismissed on the contest against defendants without costs.

            Composed and corrected by                                              

continue reading Judgment passed in the other class suit No. 62/2018